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Vuoden 2007 elokuussa alkanut finanssikriisi on ollut merkittävin haaste yhdysvaltalaiselle 
pankkialalle ja koko rahoitusjärjestelmälle 1930-luvun Suuren laman jälkeisessä historiassa. 
Finanssikriisi on yksi modernin taloustieteen tutkituimmista tapahtumasarjoista. Valtion 
rahoittamat apuohjelmat ovat kiistanalainen keino, jolla pyritään lieventämään pankkikriisien 
merkittäviä negatiivisia vaikutuksia kokonaistalouteen. 
Tämä tutkielma tutkii Yhdysvaltain valtionvarainministeriön (U.S. Treasury) Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (“TARP”) -rahoitusapuohjelman vaikutusta pankkien suorituskykyyn tutkimalla 
aikaisempaa kirjallisuutta, sekä empiirisellä tutkimuksella. TARP-ohjelman vaikutusta pankkeihin 
tutkitaan raportoituihin talouslukuihin perustuvilla, kannattavuutta ja taseen koostumusta 
mittaavilla indikaattoreilla mitattuna.  
Tutkielman empiirisessä osiossa käytetyt regressiomallit on luotu vastaamaan 
tutkimuskysymykseen ”Allokoitiinko TARP-ohjelman yhteydessä sijoitetut optimaalisesti ja reilusti 
yhdysvaltalaisten pankkialan toimijoiden kesken?” tutkimalla TARP-ohjelman yhteydessä 
sijoitettujen varojen vastaanottajan kokoon suhteutetun määrän vaikutusta pankkien 
suorituskykyyn vuosi TARP-sijoitusten jälkeen.  
Aikaisemmat tutkimukset ovat muun muassa todenneet, että TARP-ohjelma heikensi pankkien  
operatiivista tehokkuutta, mutta samanaikaisesti nosti TARP-sijoituksia vastaanottaneiden 
pankkien markkinaosuuksia sekä markkinavoimaa ja antoi näille kilpailuetua. Aikaisempien 
tutkimusten mukaan TARP-ohjelma myös loi moraalikatoa pankkien keskuudessa.  
Tämän tutkielman empiirisen tutkimuksen tulokset näyttävät TARP-ohjelman yhteydessä 
sijoitettujen pääomien suhteellisen koon vaikuttaneen vastaanottavien pankkien suorituskykyyn 
vuosi TARP-sijoitusten jälkeen. TARP-sijoituksen suhteellisella koolla on ollut selvä positiivinen 
vaikutus lainojen tuottavuusasteeseen. TARP-sijoituksen suhteellisen koon vaikutus muiden 
kannattavuusindikaattoreiden kehitykseen on ollut vaihteleva. Eniten johdon tulosohjaukselle 
alttiit kannattavuusindikaattorit ovat reagoineet negatiivisimmin TARP-sijoitusten suhteelliseen 
kokoon, joka voi tarkoittaa sitä, että suuren TARP-sijoituksen vastaanottaminen on saanut 
vastaanottajapankkien johtajat purkamaan huonon taloudellisen jakson aikana kertynyttä 
alaskirjaustarvetta. Tämän tutkielman tulokset osoittavat myös, että pankkien TARP-ohjelmaa 
edeltävä suorituskyky on vaikuttanut todennäköisyyteen vastaanottaa TARP-sijoituksia: 
heikompikuntoiset pankit saivat todennäköisemmin TARP-sijoituksia. 
Mahdollinen TARP-sijoituksen vaikutus vastaanottajapankkien johtajien harkinnanvaraisten 
erien käyttöön avaa mielenkiintoisen mahdollisuuden laskentatoimen tutkimukselle kyseisen 
ilmiön edelleen tutkimiseen. Tämän tutkielman tulokset johdattelevat tulevaa tutkimusta 
selvittämään harkinnanvaraisten erien käyttöä ennen TARP-ohjelmaa, sen aikana ja sen jälkeen, 
sekä TARP-sijoitusten suhteellisten kokojen vaikutusta harkinnanvaraisten erien käyttöön.  
 
Avainsanat  finanssikriisi, CPP, TARP, pankit 
 iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 
1.1. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION ............................................................... 1 
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTION AND CONTRIBUTION............................................. 5 
1.3. STRUCTURE ........................................................................................................ 6 
2. MEASURING BANK PERFORMANCE .................................................................. 8 
2.1. BANK PERFORMANCE IN GENERAL ............................................................ 8 
2.2. BANK PROFITABILITY INDICATORS ............................................................ 8 
2.3. BANK BALANCE SHEET INDICATORS ......................................................... 9 
2.4. BANK EFFICIENCY .......................................................................................... 10 
2.5. BANK PERFORMANCE FROM REGULATORS’ VIEWPOINT ................... 10 
3. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY ............... 12 
3.1. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION’S EFFECT ON BANK PERFORMANCE
 ............................................................................................................................. 12 
3.1.1. Government Intervention’s Effect in General ..................................................... 13 
3.1.2. Comparisons of Means of Government Intervention .......................................... 14 
3.2. TARP’S EFFECT ON BANK PERFORMANCE .............................................. 15 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN ............................................................................................... 20 
4.1. HYPOTHESES.................................................................................................... 20 
4.2. DATA .................................................................................................................. 21 
4.2.1. TARP Transaction Data ...................................................................................... 21 
4.2.2. Bank Financials – Base Data ............................................................................... 23 
4.2.3. Bank Financials – Performance Effect Model’s Sample ..................................... 24 
4.2.4. Bank Financials – Lagged Performance Effect Model’s Sample ........................ 24 
4.2.5. Bank Financials – TARP Receipt Probability Model’s Sample .......................... 24 
4.3. VARIABLES ....................................................................................................... 25 
 iv 
 
4.3.1. Received TARP Funds’ Relative Size (Independent Variable) .......................... 25 
4.3.2. TARP Receipt Dummy Variable (Independent Variable) ................................... 25 
4.3.3. Bank Performance Indicators (Dependent Variables) ......................................... 26 
4.3.4. Control Variables................................................................................................. 28 
4.4. REGRESSION MODELS ................................................................................... 29 
4.4.1. Core Model – Performance Effect Model ........................................................... 29 
4.4.2. Lagged Performance Effect Model ..................................................................... 30 
4.4.3. TARP Receipt Probability Model ....................................................................... 31 
5. RESULTS .................................................................................................................... 32 
5.1. SUMMARY STATISTICS ................................................................................. 32 
5.2. STUDY OF CORRELATIONS .......................................................................... 37 
5.2.1. Correlations in the Base Data .............................................................................. 37 
5.2.2. Correlations in the Performance Effect Model’s Sample .................................... 39 
5.3. RESULTS OF THE PERFORMANCE EFFECT MODEL ................................ 41 
5.3.1. Profitability Effect Results .................................................................................. 42 
5.3.2. Balance Sheet Effect Results ............................................................................... 44 
5.4. RESULTS OF THE LAGGED PERFORMANCE EFFECT MODEL .............. 45 
5.4.1. Profitability Effect Results .................................................................................. 47 
5.4.2. Balance Sheet Effect Results ............................................................................... 48 
5.5. RESULTS OF THE TARP RECEIPT PROBABILITY MODEL ...................... 48 
6. CONCLUSIONS......................................................................................................... 52 
6.1. CONCLUSIONS ON TARP’S OPTIMAL AND FAIR ALLOCATION .......... 52 
6.2. CONCLUSIONS ON TARP’S EFFECT ON PERFORMANCE ....................... 52 
6.3. TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ............................................................. 54 
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 56 
 
  
 v 
 
TABLE OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Capital Injections and Repayments under TARP ....................................................... 3 
Figure 2. Base Data's High-Variance Variables ....................................................................... 34 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Timeline of Events Related to TARP Capital Infusions (Bayazitova & Shivdasani 
2012) ........................................................................................................................................... 4 
Table 2. Definition of Bank Performance Indicators ............................................................... 28 
Table 3. Summary Statistics for the Base Data ........................................................................ 33 
Table 4. Summary Statistics for the Performance Effect Model's Sample .............................. 35 
Table 5. Selected Summary Statistics by TARP Status ........................................................... 36 
Table 6. Correlations in the Base Data ..................................................................................... 38 
Table 7. Correlations in the Performance Effect Model’s Sample .......................................... 40 
Table 8. Results of the Performance Effect Model .................................................................. 41 
Table 9. Results of the Lagged Performance Effect Model ..................................................... 47 
Table 10. Results of the TARP Receipt Probability Model ..................................................... 50 
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Descriptions of Call Report Codes Used ………………………………………...61
 1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This section provides the background for the studied phenomenon and sets out the motivation 
for studying the Troubled Asset Relief Program’s and specifically Capital Purchase Program’s 
and Targeted Investment Program’s effect on banks’ performance. This section also lays out 
the research questions for the literature review and empirical study of this thesis, and briefly 
discusses this thesis’ contribution to the research of the subject. The structure of this thesis is 
described in chapter 1.3 of this section.  
 
1.1. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
The financial crisis that began in August 2007 has been the most significant challenge to the 
banking industry and financial system as a whole in the U.S. since the great recession in the 
1930s (Calomiris & Khan 2015; Hoshi & Kashyap 2010). It is one of the most studied series of 
events in the modern economic research. In October 3rd, 2008, the United States Congress 
accepted a proposal by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (the “Treasury”) regarding a 
program under which the U.S. government invested over $204 billion into 707 troubled banking 
industry companies during 2008 and 2009 (Hoshi & Kashyap 2010; U.S. Department of the 
Treasury 2016a). This program is the Capital Purchase Program (“CPP”), which was created 
under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), which, in turn, was created as part of the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2010). The 
investments made under the CPP continued from the first investment into eight very large banks 
on 28th of October, 2008 until 29th of December, 2009 (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2016a). 
The TARP was initially approved to invest a total of $700 billion into distressed assets of which 
the CPP’s share was $250 billion (Veronesi & Zingales 2010; U.S. Department of the Treasury 
2010). 
  
CPP funds were applied for by submitting a two-page form to each financial institution’s 
primary banking regulator: The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, or the Office of Thrift Supervision. The 
applications were reviewed using the “Camels” rating system, which evaluates six indicators: 
Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market 
risk. The successful applicants issued preferred stock for the Treasury. The preferred stock had 
to pay quarterly dividends yielding 5 % annually for the first five years and 9 % thereafter. The 
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amount invested was at the discretion of the Treasury, but always 1–3 % of the investee’s risk-
weighted assets or $25 billion at maximum. If the investee was a public company, the Treasury 
required ten-year warrants for the company’s common stock. (Duchin & Sosyura 2014.) 
 
On October 28th, 2008, just over a month after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the first 
investments under the CPP were made by the Treasury. Out of the $250 billion initially 
allocated for CPP, some $205 billion were ultimately invested in 707 financial institutions. 
(U.S. Department of the Treasury 2016b.) In addition to CPP, the Treasury created a 
complementary program, the Targeted Investment Program (“TIP”), which comprised two 
investments of $20 billion each to Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America in December 2008 and 
January 2009, respectively (Calomiris & Khan 2015). The TIP investments brought the total 
amount invested under the programs to approximately $245 billion. 
 
The recipients of largest amounts of CPP and TIP investments combined were Citigroup Inc. 
($45 billion), Bank of America ($45 billion), JPMorgan Chase & Co., and Wells Fargo & Co., 
with $25 billion each. In total, nine financial institutions received more than $5 billion per 
company and 27 more than $1 billion, respectively (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2016b; 
Calomiris & Khan 2015.) On 27.1.2016, the banks that had received TARP funds had repaid 
approximately $266 billion to the Treasury, while approximately $258 million of the original 
investments was outstanding (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2016b). The investments and 
repayments under TARP are shown in Figure 1 below.  
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FIGURE 1. CAPITAL INJECTIONS AND REPAYMENTS UNDER TARP 
The figure below presents the capital injections made by the Treasury under TARP and the repayments made by 
the funded banks on a timeline between 28.10.2008 and 27.1.2016. The figures include combined data for CPP 
and TIP (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2016b). The total investment under TARP (only CPP and TIP) by the 
Treasury was approximately $245 billion. The banks that had received TARP funds have repaid approximately 
$266 billion to the Treasury. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
TARP was directed towards financial institutions including bank holding companies (“BHC”), 
commercial banks, savings and loan institutions and other thrifts, and under 8 % of the TARP 
fund recipients were savings and loan institutions or other thrifts (Berger & Roman 2015). A 
timeline of the events around the TARP programs is presented in Table 1 below. This thesis 
studies the effect on CPP and TIP (hereafter together referred to as “TARP”) on BHCs and 
commercial banks, which are together referred to as banks. The exclusion of savings and loan 
institutions and other thrifts is due to their financial information not being fully compatible with 
banks and due to the fact that they compete in different ways than banks (Berger & Roman 
2015). These exclusions are in line with earlier studies conducted by e.g. Harris et al. (2013), 
Cornett et al. (2013), and Berger & Roman (2015).  
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TABLE 1. TIMELINE OF EVENTS RELATED TO TARP CAPITAL INFUSIONS 
(BAYAZITOVA & SHIVDASANI 2012) 
The table below presents a timeline of the events around the TARP capital injections in 2008–2009. 
October 3, 2008: President Bush signs into law the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which 
establishes the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). 
October 13, 2008: U.S. Treasury interim assistant secretary Neel Kashkari announces a standardized program 
to purchase equity in a broad array of financial institutions. 
October 14, 2008: The U.S. Treasury announces the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), which allows U.S. 
financial institutions to apply for a preferred stock investment by the U.S. Treasury. Nine large financial 
organizations announce they will subscribe to the facility in an aggregate amount of $125 billion. The FDIC 
creates a new Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program to guarantee the senior debt of all FDIC-insured 
institutions as well as deposits through June 30, 2009. 
November 14, 2008: The deadline for publicly held financial institutions to apply for a CPP preferred stock 
investment by the U.S. Treasury. 
February 4, 2009: The U.S. Treasury modifies restrictions on executive compensation for TARP participants. 
The total annual compensation for senior executive officers is limited to $500,000, except for long-term 
restricted stock awards. Golden parachutes are prohibited for the top ten senior executives, and the next twenty-
five executives are prohibited from receiving golden parachute payments greater than one year’s compensation 
upon severance. Bonus claw-back provisions were extended from the top five executives to the next twenty- 
five executives. 
February 10, 2009: U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner announces the Financial Stability Plan 
involving forward-looking loss assessments for nineteen U.S. banks with assets exceeding $100 billion, the 
Capital Assessment Program (CAP) whereby the U.S. Treasury will purchase preferred stock convertible to 
common equity in eligible banks, the creation of a Public-Private Investment Fund to acquire troubled loans 
and assets from financial institutions, expansion of the Federal Reserve’s Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan 
Facility (TALF), and new initiatives to stem residential mortgage foreclosures and to support small business 
lending. 
February 17, 2009: President Obama signs into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 
which includes a variety of spending measures and tax cuts intended to promote economic recovery. The act 
includes most of the executive compensation restrictions for TARP participants announced on February 4, 2009. 
The act includes additional compensation restrictions for TARP participants with a prohibition on bonuses, 
retention awards, or incentive compensation exclusive of long-term restricted stock awards that do not exceed 
one-third of the annual compensation. 
February 23, 2009: The U.S. Treasury and federal bank regulatory agencies issue a joint statement in which 
they reiterate that under CAP, capital will be provided in the form of mandatorily convertible preferred stocks, 
and previous capital injections under CPP will also be eligible to be exchanged for these shares. 
February 24, 2009: Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke clarifies to Congress that the bank stress tests are 
not a precursor to nationalization of banks. 
February 25, 2009: The U.S. Treasury publishes a white paper, term sheet, and FAQs containing details on the 
CAP program. 
February 26, 2009: Iberiabank Corp. files notice with the Treasury Department that it will redeem all 90,000 
outstanding shares of U.S. Treasury preferred stock for a redemption price of $90.6 million. 
March 19, 2009: The U.S. Congress proposes and passes H.R. 1586 in under twenty-four hours with an 
overwhelming margin. The bill imposes a punitive excise tax of 90% on all employee bonus payments made, 
retroactive to January 1, 2009, by institutions that have received $5 billion or more in TARP capital. 
March 31, 2009: Four bank holding companies (Marin Bancorp., Iberiabank Corp., Old National Bancorp., and 
Signature Bank) announce that they have redeemed all of the preferred shares issued to the U.S. Treasury under 
CPP. 
April 24, 2009: The Federal Reserve Board publishes a white paper describing the process and methodology 
employed by federal banking supervisory authorities in their forward-looking assessment (stress test) of large 
U.S. bank holding companies. 
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TABLE 1. CONTINUED 
May 6, 2009: The Wall Street Journal reports that results of the government’s stress tests for several banks have 
been leaked to the media. It reports that American Express, Bank of New York Mellon, Capital One Financial, 
Goldman Sachs, MetLife, and JPMorgan Chase will not need to raise additional capital, while Bank of America 
needs $34 billion, Wells Fargo requires $15 billion, and GMAC needs $11.5 billion. The Journal reports that 
Citigroup, State Street, Morgan Stanley, and Regions Financial will also need additional capital. 
May 7, 2009: The Federal Reserve releases the results of the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) 
for the nineteen largest U.S. bank holding companies. The assessment finds that ten firms need to add $185 
billion to capital but that transactions and revenues since the end of 2008 have reduced the capital shortfall to 
$75 billion. Banks that need to augment capital will be required to develop a detailed plan to be approved by its 
primary supervisor within thirty days and to raise the additional capital by November 2009. 
June 10, 2009: The U.S. Treasury Department issues detailed rules regarding the limitations on executive and 
employee compensation imposed under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 for companies 
receiving funds under TARP. Treasury secretary Timothy Geithner also issues a press release on compensation 
principles. 
December 31, 2009: The authority of the U.S. Treasury to purchase capital in financial institutions under CPP 
terminates, as specified in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. 
 
Implementing such an enormous-scale government-funded program is always a major decision 
affecting the global economic history. The use of taxpayer money on the revitalization of the 
financial sector is a sensitive topic as it is highly costly to taxpayers (Granja 2013), and it has 
been proven to cause a moral hazard as the banks receiving a “too-big-to-fail” status are 
incentivized to allocate their capital towards more risky uses (O’Hara & Shaw 1990; Hoque 
2013; Harris et al. 2013). Due to the aforementioned factors, the optimal and fair allocation of 
such government funds is highly important. 
 
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTION AND CONTRIBUTION 
Unintended effects of government guarantees on different entities’ incentives have been 
systematically studied since the 1970s by e.g. Ehrenberg & Oaxaca (1976) and Mortensen 
(1977), who studied the subject of unemployment insurances’ effect on employees’ 
employment decisions (Duchin & Sosyura 2014). Prior research (e.g. Ding et al. 2013) has 
covered the topic of government intervention’s effect on banks’ reported performance in 
geographies other than the United States. Government intervention’s, including the CPP’s, 
effect on banks’ stock performance and financial results has been studied in the U.S. as well 
(e.g. Berger & Roman 2015; Farruggio et al. 2013; Harris et al. 2013; Liu et al. 2013). The 
previous research has, however, only studied the phenomenon by labeling the banks that 
received any CPP/TARP funds as “TARP banks” and others as “non-TARP banks”. This 
thesis’s approach complements the prior research by widening the research basis comprising 
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logistic regression studies by taking into account the relative size of the TARP contribution per 
bank. 
 
The research question of this thesis is: 
Were the TARP funds allocated optimally and fairly among the U.S. banking industry’s 
entities? 
 
The research question is answered through a literature review studying government 
intervention’s and TARP’s effect on bank performance, and by conducting an empirical study 
analyzing the effects of relative TARP injections’ sizes on the banks’ performance. If the TARP 
funds have been allocated optimally and fairly, there should not be an observable effect on the 
banks’ performance compared to one another resultant from the relative size of received TARP 
funds. If the banks receiving larger amounts of TARP funds in relation to their total assets have 
systematically outperformed other banks one year after the capital injections, the funds have 
been unjustly allocated. This is due to the fact that the TARP funds’ target was to remedy 
troubled financial institutions, and if these troubled institutions have been systematically 
brought to a superior performance level through subsidy-like government capital, the funds 
have not been allocated optimally from the overall economy’s viewpoint. This type of 
government capital injections would potentially further invoke hazardous behavior from the 
banks as the banks that had assumed the most risk in the past would be rewarded for realized 
risk in this scenario. The research question, being of highly fundamental nature, cannot be 
answered through this thesis alone. This thesis seeks to contribute to the already vast literature 
answering the research question and to provide a basis and guidance for further research 
contributing to answering the research question. 
 
1.3. STRUCTURE 
This thesis uses two main methods to study the effect the relative size of received TARP funds 
has had on the U.S. banks’ performance: a literature review to provide adequate background, 
and an empirical study. The literature review is conducted in the second and third chapters of 
this thesis. The first literature review section discusses bank performance measurement 
methods. The third chapter begins with a section studying government intervention’s effect on 
bank performance in general, globally. Thereafter, TARP’s effect on performance is studied 
through literature review. 
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The fourth chapter of this thesis presents the research design of the empirical study. The fourth 
chapter includes sections describing the hypotheses, data used, variables formed, and the three 
regression models formulated based on the data and variables. The fifth chapter then presents 
the results of the regression models including separate sections for descriptive statistics, studies 
of correlations, and for each of the models’ results. The sixth and last chapter of this thesis 
draws the conclusions from the literature review and empirical study conducted, and suggests 
topics for further research on the subject of TARP’s effect on bank performance. 
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2. MEASURING BANK PERFORMANCE 
Banks report their profit and loss statements and balance sheets in a different manner to normal 
companies, due to which the performance measurements of banks are different than those of 
normal companies. In order to provide basis for this thesis’ subject of analyzing TARP’s effect 
on bank performance, this section provides a brief review of bank performance measurement. 
Bank profitability and balance sheet measures are addressed, after which a brief introduction of 
bank efficiency is provided. 
 
2.1. BANK PERFORMANCE IN GENERAL 
The primary objective of any financial system is to provide information for investors regarding 
the reporting entities for the use of investors, and in this sense the financial reporting of banks 
is no different to other entities (Bushman 2014). However, banks are in many respects different 
to companies competing in other industries and have a set of characteristics that are unique to 
the financial sector (Bushman 2014). Due to this, banks’ financial reports differ materially from 
those of non-financial entities. Even though performance measurement usually varies between 
all different industries, banks’ performance measurement has an unusually high amount of 
dissimilarities with other industries due to the industry-specific financial reporting.  
 
Bank performance is often measured by market information, i.e. stock prices (see e.g. 
(Fahlenbrach et al. 2012) due to the stock prices theoretically fully reflecting all publicly 
available information as they unbiasedly react to information in real time (Ball, Ray; Brown 
1968). Therefore, stock prices do not only contain information on the banks fundamentals, but 
also on expected government actions (Bond & Goldstein 2015). However, attempting to 
contribute to the accounting literature in bank performance research, this thesis focuses on bank 
performance measured by accounting-based information in order to measure the actual realized 
financial performance of the banks after the receipt of TARP funds.  
 
2.2. BANK PROFITABILITY INDICATORS 
A bank’s income statement differs from a regular company’s income statement. It is typically 
divided into four components: net interest income, provision for loan losses, net non-interest 
income, and securities gains and losses (Beatty & Liao 2014). The regulation concerning result 
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planning is stricter for banks than for ordinary companies and therefore e.g. return on assets 
(net income after taxes as a percent of total assets) and return on loans (interest and fees on 
loans as a percent of total loans and leases) are the most fundamental accounting-based 
measures of profitability for banks. Return on assets is used as the main accounting-based 
measure of bank profitability by e.g. Blackwell et al. (1994), Hryckiewicz (2014), Lin & Zhang 
(2009), and Ding et al. (2013). Return on loans is used as one of the core indicators of bank 
profitability by e.g. Cornett et al. (2013) and Logue & Rivoli (1992). 
 
2.3. BANK BALANCE SHEET INDICATORS 
In addition to measuring profitability, accounting-based information can be used to measure 
e.g. liquidity, solvency, and other balance sheet based performance indicators. Banks’ balance 
sheets are also reported on a format different than ordinary companies’ balance sheets. The 
most used balance sheet based bank performance measures include tier I common equity ratio 
(used by e.g. Harris et al. 2013, Cornett et al. 2013, Li 2013, and Fahlenbrach et al. 2012) which 
is an indicator specific to banks and measures the amount of tier I common equity as regulated 
by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011) in relation to the banks total assets. 
Liquidity ratio (used by e.g. Granja 2013, Cornett et al. 2013, and Hryckiewicz 2014) is a highly 
used bank balance sheet indicator, which measures the cash and investment securities as a 
percentage of total assets. Different nonperforming loan ratios (used by e.g. Lin & Zhang 2009, 
Nakashima 2016, and Farruggio et al. 2013) are frequently used measures, which include a 
component formed by summing loans and leases that are 90 or more days due, nonaccruing 
loans and leases, and other real estate owned, which is then divided by e.g. total loans and 
leases. Another frequently used balance sheet based bank performance indicator is core deposits 
to total assets (used by e.g. Beatty & Liao 2014, Cornett et al. 2013, and James 1991), which 
measures the sum of transactions deposits and non-transaction deposits of under $100 000 as a 
percentage of total assets. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned balance sheet indicators, bank balance sheet information is 
used as a measure of the banks’ risk-taking (Black & Hazelwood 2013). Riskiness of an asset 
is also one of the factors influencing the asset’s performance, as a higher performance is 
required of a more risky asset (Sharpe 1966) and thus a lower risk enhances the risk-adjusted 
performance of an asset, here a bank. Bank risk can be measured by the aforementioned balance 
sheet based indicators. In addition, e.g. expected delayed loan loss provisions, which is derived 
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from bank balance sheet information, can be used to measure bank risk (Bushman & Williams 
2015). 
 
2.4. BANK EFFICIENCY  
In addition to profitability and balance sheet structure indicators, the banking industry is 
evaluated on the basis of its actors’ efficiency. This thesis does not concentrate on bank 
efficiency, but the topic is briefly discussed in order to provide a more comprehensive context 
for bank performance measurement. Efficiency as it is meant in the banking literature is an 
indicator specific to the banking industry. Bank efficiency is measured as the relative efficiency 
score’s distance from the efficient frontier first introduced by Markowitz (1952) (Bonin et al. 
2005).  
 
Assessing the efficiency of banks has been a core topic of the research relating to bank 
performance for decades. The main factor causing controversy in the research field is the 
appropriate inputs and outputs of the banks’ production process. Even though wide consensus 
regarding the measurement of bank efficiency does not exist, it is most commonly accepted that 
the main inputs are fixed assets and employees. (Holod & Lewis 2011.)  
 
2.5. BANK PERFORMANCE FROM REGULATORS’ VIEWPOINT 
The fact that the recent financial crisis resulted in a need for government bailouts of banks 
brought more into discussions the concerns regarding proper monitoring of banks’ risk taking 
incentives, which led to demands for additional equity capital to be held by banks. In fact, one 
of the most central of the items regulated in Basel III is tier I common equity. (Beatty & Liao 
2014.) This is one of the key indicators of riskiness of a bank’s assets, which is arguably the 
most pressing fundament the regulators are concerned with. For example Barth & Landsman 
(2010), Nakashima (2016), and Akins et al. (2016) use riskiness of bank assets as one of the 
key performance indicators. 
 
The capital requirements are also in the core of the most central regulatory bank performance 
indicator regarding the U.S. banks in the wake of TARP, i.e. the CAMELS rating system. This 
system was used to evaluate the TARP applicants. CAMELS stands for Capital adequacy, Asset 
quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk. For example Duchin 
 11 
 
& Sosyura (2014) assess bank performance through estimating CAMELS proxies for their 
sample. They use tier I common equity ratio as Capital adequacy, the negative of noncurrent 
loans and leases as a percentage of total loans and leases as Asset quality, negative of the 
number of corrective actions taken against executives by regulators as Management quality, 
ROE as Earnings, cash divided by deposits as Liquidity, and ratio of absolute difference 
between short-term assets and short-term liabilities to earning assets as Sensitivity to market 
risk. Fairly dissimilar proxies have also been used, as e.g. Beatty & Liao (2011) and Bushman 
& Williams (2015) use ROA as a proxy for Management. 
 
One measure for bank performance from the overall economy’s viewpoint is their ability to 
borrow and lend. For example Calomiris & Khan (2015) and Li (2013) use different measures 
of lending activity as bank performance indicators in their studies. Calomiris & Khan (2015) 
use the supply of lending as a performance indicator in their study of TARP banks. Likewise,  
Li (2013) uses the credit supply measured by all types of loans and the level of new loans issued 
as bank performance indicators in his study. 
 
  
 12 
 
3. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
This section compiles the earlier literature on the subject of government intervention’s and 
TARP’s effect on banks’ performance. This section does not purport to include a review of all 
relevant studies published on the subject, but seeks to review the most relevant parts of the 
studies concentrated on the phenomenon in question. First, this section reviews earlier literature 
on different types of government interventions’ effect on bank performance in general, and 
second, studies on TARP’s effect on bank performance are reviewed. 
 
This thesis focuses only on the government intervention conducted in the form of government-
led programs that have subsidy-like components, i.e. the so called “bailout programs”. It can 
sometimes be disputable whether a certain intervention measure is in fact a “bailout”, but the 
clearest intervention forms that do not provide the banks any subsidy-like compensation is 
excluded from the scope of this thesis. An example of this type of government intervention is 
intervention in the form of pure regulation including no compensation components. 
 
3.1. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION’S EFFECT ON BANK PERFORMANCE 
Government intervention’s forms and weight have been actively discussed by scholars since 
the early 1900s (Barth et al. 2004). Systemic banking crises have induced formidable pressure 
on national governments to take interfering action. The actions taken, in turn, have raised 
questions regarding the long term effects they will have in the behavior of the banking sector 
(Hryckiewicz 2014.) 
 
In the banking industry in particular, the phenomenon behind the term "too big to fail" has 
become one of the most discussed topics in the 2010s. The term was formally introduced in 
September 1984, when the Comptroller of the Currency stated to the Congress that some banks 
were simply "too big to fail" and announced admittance of total deposit insurance for these 
banks (O’Hara & Shaw 1990). The problem with the too big to fail status of some banks appears 
in the form of moral hazard, which, in the banking context, means that the too big to fail banks 
engage in higher-risk behavior than they would without the knowledge of these government 
safety nets (Dam & Koetter 2012; Cordella & Yeyati 2003). It has been widely argued that the 
general ex-ante consensus assuming public policy that appoints some institutions the status of 
too big to fail caused the banks to take on the risk that resulted in the recent financial crisis, i.e. 
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the cause of moral hazard are not the programs themselves but the assumption that these 
measures will be taken in a time of crisis (Boyd & Heitz 2016).  
 
3.1.1. Government Intervention’s Effect in General 
Critics of government intervention argue that the actions misspend tax money, unjustly reward 
banks and their shareholders, and worsen problems resultant from moral hazards. While, in 
turn, proponents of government intervention argue that the measures help mitigating the 
negative externalities resultant from weak balance sheets, reduced lending, and the spreading 
of financial crises. (Bond & Goldstein 2015.) Continuing on a critical note, e.g. Barth et al. 
(2004) find in their study that generous government-backed programs, which TARP is, in the 
form of deposit insurance schemes have a strong negative effect on bank stability. They also 
conclude that government ownership in banks result in worse banking outcomes and is 
positively correlated with corruption. In addition, they argue that government ownership of 
banks does not contribute to an environment of independent development, efficiency, or 
stability, controlling for other aspects of the regulatory and supervisory environment. 
Furthermore, Granja (2013) suggests that the interventions conducted during the financial 
crisis, including injecting capital into ailing financial institutions, are ultimately costly to 
taxpayers. 
 
The arguments in favor of government intervention are often Pigouvian, based on A. Pigou’s 
views, which are well-presented in e.g. Pigou (1951). These arguments are claiming that the 
presence of monopoly power, externalities, and informational asymmetries create a role for 
government interventions to potentially mitigate these market failures and hence improve social 
welfare of the society. The Pigouvian view assumes that there are market failures and that the 
government is able and willing act to salvage those failures. On the contrary, many disagree 
with the Pigouvian views. Some even argue that the failures are not highly significant in size. 
(Barth et al. 2004.) 
 
In their study including a sample of 3 554 German banks from 1995 until 2006, Dam & Koetter 
(2012) produce robust results stating that government-imposed safety nets in the banking 
industry induce moral hazard. Gropp et al. (2011) studied a sample of more than 5 000 banks 
including observations from thirty different countries and found that banks with outright public 
ownership base took on higher risk, and that an increase in banks’ competitors’ government 
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guarantees had a significantly positive effect on the banks’ risk-taking, while the protected 
banks themselves did not show higher risk-taking.  
 
Nakashima (2016) studied Japan’s two large-scale government-led capital injections in 1998 
and 1999. He studied the capital injections’ effects on risk, lending, and profitability of 21 
Japanese banks in connection to the 1998 program and 15 Japanese banks in connection to the 
1999 program. He finds that the programs reduced the risk of default of the banks receiving the 
capital injections, and that the programs did not substantially improve the profitability or the 
lending behavior of the capital-injected banks. However, he also states that the main reason for 
the lending behavior not improving was most likely due to their default risks increasing during 
the severe recession that began after the two programs. 
 
Despite the subject having a relatively large amount of research conducted, the existing studies 
do not provide definitive conclusions on government interventions’ impact on banking sector 
risk, due to the limitations of the used methodologies. The aforementioned results in 
policymakers having no clear guidance from the academic literature on how to react to problems 
in the banking sector amidst financial crises. (Hryckiewicz 2014.) 
 
3.1.2. Comparisons of Means of Government Intervention 
The effect of an individual intervention instrument always depends on the structure and 
effectiveness of the whole intervention program. The existing empirical research does not 
provide decisive conclusions regarding the optimal form of a government-led program or 
regarding the combinations of mechanisms that would most effectively mitigate the negative 
effects induced by government interventions. The absence of empirical evidence regarding the 
subject implies that policymakers have inadequate means to assess banking sector risk. 
(Hryckiewicz 2014.) 
 
Philippon & Schnabl (2013) find that government interventions in the banking industry 
generate two types of rents for banks: informational and macroeconomic. They show in their 
paper that the most optimal intervention mitigates informational rents by using preferred stock 
with warrants as the means of injecting capital into the banks, as was done in the case of CPP 
and TIP. Additionally, they find that the macroeconomic rents are proposed to be minimized 
by conditioning implementation on sufficient participation from the banks. On the contrary to 
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Philippon & Schnabl's (2013) findings, House & Masatlioglu (2015) find that while equity 
investments by the government as a tool of providing stability amidst crises is an efficient way 
to increase investment, it also has a negative side-effect, which is reduced interbank market 
liquidity. They argue that asset purchases increase investment, and also interbank market 
liquidity, and is a more efficient way to mitigate the crises. In addition, they find that asset 
purchase programs allocate more funds to the banks that need them the most. 
 
Hryckiewicz (2014) analyzes the long-term effects of various different government intervention 
measures on bank stability in her paper. She examines institutions during 23 different financial 
crises in 23 different countries. The regression estimations conducted in her study show that 
government interventions increase risk in the post-crisis periods and that this might be due to 
(at least) three factors: reduced market discipline, inefficient management, and a lack of 
restructuring processes. Rather than providing guidance for which types of intervention 
measures could be the most optimal, her study suggests that the ultimate focus in government 
intervention programs should be targeted towards creating mechanisms intensifying regulatory 
monitoring or providing greater market control as a counterweight for the automatic 
incentivizing of banks’ risk-taking behavior. 
 
Cordella & Yeyati (2003) compare the means of government intervention from a slightly 
different angle, not comparing different subsidy-like financial instruments themselves available 
for governments, but the ex-ante vs. ex-post nature of the intervention programs. They conclude 
that an ex-ante commitment induces moral hazard in the banks’ behavior, but in the case of ex-
post discretionary bailout programs, the “value effect” of the programs can effectively reduce 
the risk appetite of the banks, even more than offsetting the moral hazard’s effect. By “value 
effect”, the authors mean that the programs incentivize the banks to act prudentially by 
increasing the banks’ charter value. 
 
3.2. TARP’S EFFECT ON BANK PERFORMANCE 
Hoshi & Kashyap (2010) argue in their study of Japanese banks that a financial rescue 
program’s success is highly dependent on the willingness of the banks to participate in it. This 
is relevant for this study as the success of the financial rescue program is partly reflected 
through its effect on shareholders’ returns under the period of the rescue program. With regards 
to TARP, the incentive for banks to participate was reduced due to the TARP injections being 
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senior to common shares and thus reducing the upside potential for shareholders in case of 
recovery of the bank in question (Bayazitova & Shivdasani 2012). This would contribute 
negatively to the stock price of the banks receiving TARP injections. On the other hand, 
Philippon & Schnabl (2013) argue that preferred stock investment, such as in TARP, is the most 
optimal form of government-led rescue program capital injections.  
 
In line with Philippon & Schnabl's (2013) suggestion, Bayazitova & Shivdasani (2012) find in 
their study that the initial nine recipients of TARP funds gained strongly positive excess returns 
on October 14, 2008. They find that on average, the said excess return for the nine initial TARP 
recipients is 14.9 %, with a median of 17.4 %, and both their results are statistically significant 
at the 1% level. Despite this positive stock price reaction, Bayazitova & Shivdasani (2012)  also 
find that TARP injections were seen as costly by the banks, and some banks chose not to 
participate in TARP or rejected the capital injections. Furthermore, they find that voluntary 
rejection of TARP funds was more often done by the healthier banks. 
 
Bayazitova & Shivdasani (2012) show in their study that banks in which the CEOs 
compensation’s were exceptionally high, had a higher probability for repaying TARP funds. 
The U.S. Government set restrictions in executive compensation for the banks that had 
participated in TARP. According to Bayazitova & Shivdasani (2012), this was a remarkable 
concern for the banks, and led to many of them to reject TARP injections and to decide to exit 
TARP. Furthermore, they find that the repayment of TARP funds was associated with 
statistically significant positive announcement returns. Bayazitova & Shivdasani (2012) also 
found in their study that the tier 1 common equity of TARP banks’ capital remained unchanged 
by TARP injections. 
 
Harris et al. (2013) conclude in their study utilizing nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis 
that the operating efficiency of banks in the U.S. declined as a result of the latest financial crisis. 
They also find that the mean change in operating efficiency was notably worse for TARP banks 
in comparison to non-TARP banks, and argue that this finding was caused by moral hazards 
stemming from the bailout. They argue that the operating efficiency of the banks weakened as 
a result of TARP due to the government intervention reducing the managers’ incentives to adopt 
best practices improving their banks’ asset quality. 
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Berger & Roman (2015) find in their study using a difference-in-difference approach, that 
TARP resulted in competitive advantages for its recipients. They also conclude that TARP 
recipients increased their market shares as well as market power. They explain the results by 
arguing that the results may be driven primarily by investors perceiving TARP banks as safer 
than non-TARP banks, and that this effect is partially offset by TARP funds being relatively 
expensive for the recipient banks. They also argue that the competitive advantages the TARP 
banks received were primarily or entirely experienced only by the TARP banks that repaid the 
received funds to Treasury early. 
 
Black & Hazelwood (2013) studied the risk-taking effect the TARP had on recipient banks. 
They categorize the studied banks into non-TARP and TARP banks, and into small, medium, 
and large banks. The total assets hurdles for medium and large banks are set at one and ten 
billion dollars, respectively. They find, that after the TARP injections, the risk rating of loan 
originations increased significantly for large TARP banks, while the same indicator decreased 
significantly for small TARP banks, relative to non-TARP banks. Their findings suggest that 
TARP’s effect on banks’ risk-taking differed depending on bank size. They also note, however, 
that these results may also be due to the TARP having conflicting objectives regarding 
capitalization and expanded lending. Said objectives of the TARP can be seen to have been 
what is stated in the Public Law § 5201’s purposes, i.e. : “(1) to immediately provide authority 
and facilities that the Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore liquidity and stability to the 
financial system of the United States; and (2) to ensure that such authority and such facilities 
are used in a manner that— (A) protects home values, college funds, retirement accounts, and 
life savings; (B) preserves homeownership and promotes jobs and economic growth; (C) 
maximizes overall returns to the taxpayers of the United States; and (D) provides public 
accountability for the exercise of such authority.” (Pub. L. 110–343, div. A, § 2, Oct. 3, 2008, 
122 Stat. 3766.). 
 
One of the specific objectives of TARP was to improve the banks’ balance sheets by the capital 
injections and consequently improve the banks’ ability to borrow and lend (Calomiris & Khan 
2015). A piece of evidence suggesting that TARP succeeded in improving banks’ balance sheets 
is, that during the period December 31st, 2008–March 31st, 2009, the tier I capital ratio 
increased by 300 basis points in banks receiving TARP funds relative to an increase of only 40 
basis points in non-TARP banks, on average (Calomiris & Khan 2015). In connection to these 
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specific objectives, there is also evidence supporting the claim that TARP recipient banks were 
more willing and able to increase lending than non-TARP banks (Li 2013). 
 
Li (2013) finds in his paper concentrating on estimating stimulus effect that TARP injections 
had on the loan supply by provided by the banks, that TARP injections increased the loan 
supply. He finds that for banks with tier I capital ratios below median, the loan supply was 
increased by an annualized rate of 6.36 % due to TARP. He found the increase in all major loan 
types, and concludes, that this translates into a total of $404 billion of additional loan capital 
provided by TARP banks. Li (2013) also states that TARP banks employed ca. a third of their 
TARP injections into new loans and used the remainder to strengthen their balance sheets. In 
addition, he concludes that little evidence exists to support the claim that loans issued by TARP 
recipients were of lower quality than those issued by non-TARP banks, and that overall, TARP 
provided a positive stimulus on loan supply during the financial crisis. However, the loan supply 
during the financial crisis decreased by 47 % during the fourth quarter of 2008 relative to third 
quarter and by 79 % relative to the second quarter of 2007 (Ivashina & Scharfstein 2010). 
 
Farruggio et al. (2013) conducted an empirical study on TARP’s first announcement’s, revised 
TARP’s announcement’s, TARP capital injections’, and TARP repayments’ effects on 
shareholder value and the banks’ risk exposure. They study the excess returns by calculating 
cumulated average abnormal returns and the risk by utilizing capital asset pricing model. They 
find in their study that the announcements and capital repayments induced positive wealth 
effects and risk decreases for the banks. On the other hand, they conclude that equity capital 
injections by the Treasury to banks are observed as a significant barrier to restore confidence 
and stability. In addition, they find that TARP announcements and injections increased systemic 
risk, but capital repayments induced no significant effect on systemic risk. 
 
Khan & Vyas (2015) studied TARP’s effect on banks’ seasoned common equity offerings 
(SEOs). They find that only 12 % of losses accountable to the financial crisis were replenished 
through SEOs in 2009 and 2010. They find that SEOs were conducted by TARP recipients in 
higher relative amounts than other banks, and that it is not explained by TARP banks’ economic 
or regulatory capital requirements. Their study concludes that SEOs by TARP banks in 2009 
and 2010 cover 50 % of the total value of SEOs by U.S. banks during the period of 1994–2010. 
They control for economic and regulatory capital determinants of SEOs, and find, that TARP 
banks were more likely to arrange an SEO within four quarters after TARP receipt than non-
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TARP banks. Further, they state that the proceeds gained from the SEOs were used to repay 
TARP funds without compromising loan growth. Their findings indicate that TARP was, 
overall, a remarkable event in the history of U.S. bank SEOs. 
 
TARP mandated a forced issuance of TARP funds, in the form of preferred stock, by the largest 
banks, while the smaller participating banks were not forced to issue TARP preferred stock 
(Kim & Stock 2012). Kim & Stock (2012) conducted a study on TARP’s effect on bonds, 
preferred stock, and common stock, focusing on two types of outstanding preferred stock: trust 
preferred stock, which is senior to TARP funds, and non-trust preferred stock, which has an 
equal claim with TARP funds. They find, that on the TARP announcement date, trust preferred 
stock gained more benefits from TARP receipt than non-trust preferred stock, and conclude that 
the finding is consistent with the priority rule theory, but inconsistent with the default theory. 
Their findings show that the effect persisted for banks which were forced to receive TARP 
funds and for banks that were not. 
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This section describes the design of the empirical study conducted as part of this thesis. The 
hypotheses of the empirical study are presented in this section. The data used in the empirical 
study and its sources are also introduced in this section. In addition, the regression models used 
in the empirical study as well as the specific variables used in the regression models are 
described in detail in this section.  
 
4.1. HYPOTHESES 
The main objective of this thesis is to study the TARP’s effects on performance, and through 
this, contribute to answering the question regarding whether the TARP funds were allocated 
optimally and fairly among the U.S. banking industry. To complement the earlier literature 
presented in chapters 2 and 3, six hypotheses are formed. In accordance with e.g. Farruggio et 
al. (2013), the most fundamental and first hypothesis of this thesis is as follows: 
 
H1: The received TARP funds’ relative size has an effect on the banks’ performance. 
  
If this hypothesis is confirmed, the funds can be argued to not have been allocated fairly, as the 
relative amount of TARP funds received should not have an observable effect on the banks as 
the sample includes all banks with sufficient data. Especially, if the relative amount has an 
observable positive effect on performance, the banks receiving more TARP funds relative to 
their size would have received an unfair competitive advantage from the government. To clarify 
the hypotheses and their ability to explain the studied effects, it is stated that if the post-TARP 
performance was compared to pre-TARP performance, the TARP banks improving their 
performance more would be an anticipated result and not indicate unfair allocation of TARP 
funds. But, as the TARP and non-TARP banks are compared with each other in the period one 
year after TARP, the fair allocation of the TARP funds would have to result in no significant 
effect of relative size of TARP funds received on the banks’ performance.  
 
In addition to the main hypothesis, more specific hypotheses are formed in order to complement 
the first hypothesis and to set the basis for acquiring more insight and structured sub-results 
from the study. Testing the second hypothesis provides more insight into how optimally and 
fairly the TARP funds were injected into the U.S. banks. Testing the additional hypotheses 
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divides the main hypothesis’ theme into parts that individually provide information on the 
separate underlying factors comprising the result of studying the main hypothesis, i.e. the total 
performance of the banks. The second hypothesis is divided into four parts as follows: 
  
H2a: The received TARP funds’ relative size has an effect on the banks’ solvency. 
 
H2b: The received TARP funds’ relative size has an effect on the banks’ risk-taking. 
 
H2c: The received TARP funds’ relative size has an effect on the banks’ overall profitability. 
 
H2d: The received TARP funds’ relative size has an effect on the banks’ lending activities’ 
profitability. 
 
The third hypothesis is set in order to further assess the results of the first two models addressing 
the hypotheses H1 and H2. Testing the third hypothesis provides more insight for studying which 
factors have had the most influence on the banks’ performance and moreover, what were the 
values of the indicators prior to the TARP investments. By gaining further insight into the state 
in which the banks were, measured by the performance indicators used in this thesis, it is 
possible to analyze the effects of TARP on performance in more depth. The third hypothesis is 
as follows: 
 
H3: The banks’ prior performance has an effect on the banks’ probability to receive TARP 
funds. 
 
By testing the six hypotheses presented above, the study attempts to contribute to the existing 
literature by providing more detail into the research that is concerned with the effects of TARP 
on its recipients, their competitors, and the U.S. and global economies in general. The 
hypotheses are tested with the methods presented in chapter 4.4. 
 
4.2. DATA 
4.2.1. TARP Transaction Data 
The information on the TARP contributions has been obtained from the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury’s TARP Transaction Report, dated 27.1.2016. The Treasury publishes a TARP 
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Transaction Report including transaction-level information regularly: a new transaction report 
is published to the Treasury’s website within two business days of the completion of any new 
transaction under the TARP programs. The information utilized in this thesis from the TARP 
Transaction Report includes information on the recipient’s name, received TARP funds’ total 
amount, and the first date on which each institution received TARP funds.  
 
In cases where the same bank has received TARP funds to different state-specific individual 
entities, these TARP contributions have been consolidated and the earlier of the contribution 
dates has been assumed to be the TARP funding date. Due to this type of consolidations, the 
total number of financial institutions receiving TARP funds decreases to 698 individual 
institutions.  
 
The received TARP funds’ value is divided by the corresponding company’s total assets in the 
end of the quarter preceding the corresponding company’s date of receipt of TARP funds. The 
quarter in which the TARP funds are received is denoted as “q0” in this thesis, the one preceding 
it as “q-1” and the one following it as “q1”, etc. The q0 for banks not receiving TARP funds is 
determined to be the average of TARP receipt dates (24.2.2009), i.e. the first quarter of 2009. 
The banks for which no financial data or value for total assets was found for the end of the 
quarter preceding the receipt of TARP funds have been excluded from the sample. The received 
TARP funds’ values are then allocated for each observation after the receipt and before the 
repayment of the TARP funds.  
 
The time of repayment of TARP funds is defined as the date on which the last payment is issued 
to the Treasury. The repayment of TARP funds is assumed to be carried out only by the 649 
entities that have an investment status of “Redeemed, in full; warrants not outstanding” or 
“Sold, in full; warrants not outstanding” according to the TARP Transaction Report mentioned 
earlier in this chapter. The observations after the quarter in which the TARP funds have been 
repaid are then not included in the observations that are defined as “during TARP”. 
Additionally, for the entities not receiving TARP funds, the observations between Q2/2009 and 
Q2/2013 are defined as “during TARP”. This is due to the average of the TARP receipt dates 
being 24.2.2009, i.e. on the first quarter of 2009 and the average of TARP repayment dates 
being 21.5.2013. The TARP repayment dates in the average calculation are assumed to be 
31.12.2015 for the banks that have not repaid the received TARP funds at the report date of 
27.1.2016. 
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4.2.2. Bank Financials – Base Data 
The data used for assessing the banks’ performance is based on Reports of Condition and 
Income (“Call Reports”). TARP was directed towards commercial banks, BHCs, savings and 
loan institutions, and other thrifts. This thesis excludes savings and loan institutions and other 
thrifts from all observations due to their data sets not being comparable with banks’ data sets. 
These institutions are also not considered banks’ primary competition (Berger & Roman 2015). 
In this thesis, for convenience, BHCs and independent commercial banks are referred to as 
“banks”. The data is extracted from the Wharton Research Data Services’ Bank Regulatory 
database under 49 different Call Report Codes. The performance indicators used in this thesis 
are then calculated from this data as described in section 4.3.3. Banks’ reported financial 
information is then summed by bank holding companies. The banks are allocated under their 
respective BHC by the reported regulatory high holder RSSD ID. BHCs and independent 
commercial banks with more than one RSSD ID under the same name are then summed under 
the name. If a commercial bank is an independent entity, then the independent bank is treated 
as an independent entity similarly as an individual BHC. The procurement of bank financial 
data in this manner is in line with earlier studies regarding the subject of U.S. bank performance, 
for example Berger & Roman (2015), Duchin & Sosyura (2014), Liu et al. (2013), and Kashyap 
et al. (2002). 
 
The financial information on banks has been extracted from the Wharton Research Data 
Services’ Bank Regulatory and Commercial Banks databases. The latest date from which Call 
Report data is comprehensively available is the end of 2013. Data is therefore obtained for the 
period Q1/2006–Q4/2013. The base data described in this chapter is then further narrowed for 
the purpose of the model. 
 
The observations with tier 1 common equity ratio of over 100 % are replaced with 100 % (16 
observations) due to these being erroneous observations as it is impossible to have more 
common equity than the amount of total assets. The observations with nonperforming loans to 
total loans of more than 100 % (2 observations) have been replaced with 100 % due to the same 
reason. Observations with return on loans of more than 1 000 % have been excluded from the 
sample (6 observations) due to being erroneous or not representative of actual situation. 
Observations with illiquid assets to total assets of more than 1 000 % have been excluded (2 
observations) due to being erroneous or not representative of actual situation. All of the 
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aforementioned adjustments have been made due to the extreme values being highly likely not 
representative of the true situation. These values are almost certainly resultant from allocations 
between the bank and its affiliated entities in assets or profits, or from errors in the data. The 
adjustments are made in order to exclude the effect of observations based on data points which 
are not representative of the actual situation. The amount of bank-quarters resultant from the 
abovementioned filtering is 211 270 from 8 725 different banks. 
 
4.2.3. Bank Financials – Performance Effect Model’s Sample 
The Performance Effect Model’s sample is extracted from the base data described in section 
4.2.2. The Performance Effect Model’s sample includes all observations from the banks’ fourth 
quarters after receipt of TARP funds (q4). The model includes observations for the banks that 
have sufficient data for the included periods for forming all of the variables of the Performance 
Effect model. The resultant number of observations is 3 896. 
 
4.2.4. Bank Financials – Lagged Performance Effect Model’s Sample 
The Lagged Performance Effect Model’s sample is extracted from the base data described in 
section 3.2.2. The Lagged Performance Effect Model’s sample includes all observations from 
the banks’ first quarters before the receipt of TARP funds (q-1) and fourth quarters after receipt 
of TARP funds (q4). The model includes observations for the banks that have sufficient data for 
the included periods for forming all of the variables of the Lagged Performance Effect model. 
The resultant number of observations is 2 986. 
 
4.2.5. Bank Financials – TARP Receipt Probability Model’s Sample 
The TARP Receipt Probability Model’s sample is extracted from the base data described in 
section 3.2.2. The TARP Receipt Probability Model’s sample includes all observations for the 
performance indicators from the banks’ first quarters before the receipt of TARP funds (q-1) 
multiplied by 100 in order to study one percentage point changes’ effect as opposed to 100 pp 
changes. The model includes observations for the banks that have sufficient data for the 
included periods for forming all of the variables of the TARP Receipt Probability model. 
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4.3. VARIABLES 
4.3.1. Received TARP Funds’ Relative Size (Independent Variable) 
The purpose of the independent variable is to describe the amount of received TARP funds by 
financial institution in proportion to each financial institution’s size. This is conducted by 
calculating the received TARP funds divided by the financial institution’s total assets (code 
BHCK2170 in the FR Y-9C Reporting Form) at the end of the quarter preceding the quarter in 
which the bank received the TARP funds as follows:  
 
𝑟𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃 = 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃 𝑇𝐴⁄ , (1) 
where 
rTARP   = ratio of received TARP funds to total assets 
TARP    = received tarp funds as reported by the Treasury 
TA     = total assets as last reported at date of receipt of TARP funds 
 
Using a bank’s total assets as the denominator when proportioning a financial item to a 
company’s size is common practice and in line with earlier studies by e.g. Cornett et al. (2013) 
and Lin & Zhang (2009). The resulting ratio (rTARP) is used as the independent variable 
defining the significance of the received TARP funds on each financial institution. For banks 
not receiving TARP funds, the value of rTARP is zero. If a bank has not yet received the TARP 
funds on a given bank-quarter, the value of rTARP for said bank-quarter is zero. 
Correspondingly, if a bank has repaid the received TARP funds on a given bank-quarter, the 
value of said bank-quarter’s rTARP is zero.   
 
4.3.2. TARP Receipt Dummy Variable (Independent Variable) 
In addition to the rTARP variable presented above, a dummy variable indicating a bank having 
received TARP funds in connection to CPP or TIP is included in the TARP Receipt Probability 
Model in this thesis. This dummy variable, denoted as “TARP”, takes the value of 1 if a bank 
has received TARP funds and the value of 0 if it has not. This variable is used in the TARP 
Receipt Probability Model studying the performance indicators’ effect on likelihood of 
receiving TARP funds presented in section 4.4.3. 
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4.3.3. Bank Performance Indicators (Dependent Variables) 
Bank performance indicators are used as dependent variables in order to study the received 
TARP funds’ proportional size’s effect on the banks’ performance. The bank performance 
indicators are obtained from the banks’ reported financial information (accounting-based 
information) as opposed to e.g. stock price information. The thirteen bank performance 
indicators used in this thesis have been selected in accordance with Cornett et al. (2013). In 
addition to the indicators used in this thesis, Cornett et al. (2013) included “Derivatives to total 
assets” in their study, but this indicator has been left out due to insufficient data available in the 
Call Reports. In addition, the variables including a profit & loss item as their numerator have 
been annualized. The chosen bank performance indicators are presented in Table 2 below.  
 
The indicators have been calculated by first extracting the information under 49 different Call 
Report codes from the WRDS data base. These Call Report codes and their respective 
descriptions are presented in Appendix 1 of this thesis. In addition to these descriptions, 
information from The Federal Reserve Board’s MDRM Data Dictionary (available at: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/mdrm/data-dictionary), regarding e.g. detailed 
descriptions of the codes and time intervals between which the codes have been in use, is used 
to complete the variable calculations.  
 
Return on assets is calculated by dividing annualized RIAD4340 by RCFD2170. Tier I common 
equity ratio is calculated by dividing RCFD8274 by RCFD2170. Loan loss provision to total 
loans is calculated by dividing annualized RIAD4230 by the sum of RCFD2122 and 
RCFD2123. Nonperforming loans to total loans is calculated by dividing the sum of 
RCFDF639, RCFD1403, and RCFD2150 by the sum of RCFD2122 and RCFD2123. 
Noninterest expenses to total assets is calculated by dividing annualized RIAD4093 by 
RCFD2170. Noninterest income to total assets is calculated by dividing annualized RIAD4079 
by RCFD2170. Return on loans is calculated by dividing annualized RIAD4010 by RCFD2170. 
Real estate loans to total loans is calculated by dividing RCFD1410 by the sum of RCFD2122 
and RCFD2123. Liquidity ratio is calculated by dividing the sum of RCFD0071, RCFD0081, 
RCFD1754, and RCFD1773 by RCFD2170. Illiquid assets to total assets is calculated by 
dividing the sum of RCFD2122, RCFDG301, RCFDG303, RCFDG305, RCFDG307, 
RCFDG309, RCFDG311, RCFDG313, RCFDG315, RCFDG317, RCFDG319, RCFDG321, 
and RCFDG323 or the sum or RCFD8509, RCFD8511, RCFDC027, and RCFDC988 
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(depending on the report date, as the different sums represent the same assets, but under 
different codes which change from time to time) by RCFD2170. Core deposits to total assets is 
calculated by dividing the sum of RCON2215 and RCON6648 by RCFD2170. Deposit growth 
rate is calculated by calculating the percent change of the sum of RCON2215 and RCON6648 
from the latest reported quarter and dividing it by the value of RCFD2170 in the quarter 
preceding the current quarter and annualizing the resultant rate. Unused loan commitments to 
total loan commitments plus total assets is calculated by dividing the sum of RCON3814, 
RCON3815, RCON3817, RCON6550, RCON6648, RCONF164, RCONF165, RCONJ457, 
RCONJ458, and RCONJ459 by the sum of the sum of RCFD2122, RCFD2123, and 
RCFD2170. The annualized indicators have been formed using the formula below: 
  
 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 = [(1 + 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟)4] − 1 (2) 
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TABLE 2. DEFINITION OF BANK PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
The bank performance indicators selected for the empirical study in accordance with Cornett et al. (2013) are listed 
in this table. The numbering for the purpose of formula creation is presented on the first column (No.), name of 
the variable in the second column (Variable) and a description on how the variable has been calculated from the 
Call Report data in the third column (Variable description). 
No. Variable Variable description 
(1) Return on assets Annualized net income after taxes as a percent of total assets. 
(2) Tier I common equity ratio Tier I common equity as a percent of total assets. 
(3) Loan loss provision to loans Annualized loan loss provision expense as a percent of total 
loans and leases. 
(4) Nonperforming loans to total loans Total loans and leases more than 90 days past due plus 
nonaccruing loans and leases plus other real estate owned as 
a percent of total loans and leases. 
(5) Noninterest expenses to total assets Annualized noninterest expenses as a percent of total assets. 
(6) Noninterest income to total assets Annualized noninterest income as a percent of total assets. 
(7) Return on loans Annualized interest and fees on loans to total loans and 
leases. 
(8) Real estate loans to total loans Real estate loans as a percent of total loans. 
(9) Liquidity ratio Cash and book value of total investment securities as a 
percent of total assets. 
(10) Illiquid assets to total assets Loans and leases net of unearned income and allowances + 
MBS and ABS held-to-maturity securities + MBS and ABS 
available-for-sale securities as a percent of total assets. 
(11) Core deposits to total assets Transactions deposits plus non-transaction deposits under 
$100,000 as a percent of total assets. 
(12) Deposit growth rate Annualized change in core deposits as a percent of core 
deposits in the previous quarter. 
(13) Unused loan commitments to total loan 
commitments plus total assets 
Unused loan commitments at as a percent of total loan 
commitments plus total assets. 
 
4.3.4. Control Variables 
Two control variables are used in the empirical study to mitigate problems caused by potential 
omitted variables. Firstly, the model controls for size of the banks. The size of the bank is 
measured as total assets of the bank in $ billion as last reported before the receipt of TARP 
funds (variable “Size”), which is in line with e.g. Berger & Roman (2015) and Liu et al. (2013). 
In addition, e.g. Harris et al. (2013) state that larger banks had a higher probability of receiving 
funding under TARP than smaller banks, due to the fact that they posted a greater systematic 
risk to the financial system compared to the smaller banks. This supports the need of size as a 
control variable. Secondly, the effects of the banks’ belonging to a multi-bank BHC structure 
is controlled for with the dummy variable “BHC”, which takes the value of 1 if the bank is a 
BHC or is controlled by a BHC and the value 0 if not. Whether a bank belongs to a multi-bank 
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structure under a BHC is important information due to these entities’ profitability and capital 
structure indicators being exposed to potential internal capital market allocations that do not 
necessarily reflect the individual entity’s performance (Houston et al. 1997). Controlling for 
BHC is in line with e.g. Berger & Roman (2015). 
 
4.4. REGRESSION MODELS 
Three regression models are used in this thesis in order to evaluate TARP funds’ effect on 
banks’ performance and to analyze the related most important other factors in order to form a 
comprehensive view on the phenomenon. The Performance Effect model described in section 
4.4.1 is the core model that analyzes the actual effect that TARP funds have had on bank 
performance. The Lagged Performance Effect Model described in section 4.4.2 complements 
the previously mentioned model by analyzing q-1 performance’s effect on q4 performance. 
Finally, the TARP Receipt Probability Model described in section 4.4.3 complements the 
abovementioned models by analyzing q-1 performance’s effect on a bank’s probability to 
receive TARP funds. 
  
4.4.1. Core Model – Performance Effect Model 
The Performance Effect Model is used to study the performance effect of the relative size of 
the TARP contribution to a bank. The Performance Effect Model is an Ordinary Least Squares 
(“OLS”) regression model. The Performance Effect Model estimates the TARP contribution’s 
relative size’s effect on the banks performance on q4 (the fourth quarter after the receipt of 
TARP funds). For the non-TARP banks, the q0 (TARP receipt quarter) is defined as the average 
TARP receipt quarter, which is the first quarter of 2009. The OLS regression model’s variables 
are presented in more detail in chapter 4.3. The model’s formula for each bank-quarter’s 
performance indicators i = (1, 2, … , 13) is as follows: 
 
 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑞4 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑟𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃𝑞0 + 𝛽2𝑖𝐵𝐻𝐶 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑞−1 + 𝜀𝑖, (3) 
where  
Performance = performance indicator variables 1–13 presented in Table 2 
β0      = intercept 
rTARP   = ratio of received TARP funds to total assets at receipt of TARP funds 
BHC    = dummy variable indicating whether the bank is part of a multi-bank structure 
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Size     = total assets as last reported before receipt of TARP funds in $ billion 
ε      = error term  
 
4.4.2. Lagged Performance Effect Model 
The Lagged Performance Effect Model is used to study the banks’ q-1 (latest reported quarterly 
figures before receipt of TARP funds) performance’s effect on the respective q4 performance. 
The Lagged Performance Effect Model is an Ordinary Least Squares (“OLS”) regression model 
similar to the Performance Effect Model with the performance indicators’ q-1 values added as 
independent variables. For the non-TARP banks, the q0 (TARP receipt quarter) is defined as 
the average TARP receipt quarter, which is the first quarter of 2009.  
 
The Lagged Performance Effect Model is used in order to bring further robustness to the 
Performance Effect Model’s analysis and to separate the earlier performance’s coefficient of 
determination associated with the future performance from the Performance Effect Model. The 
lagged performance indicators are used in order to control for the endogeneity of the 
performance of the banks by including the lagged performance values. This is in line with e.g. 
Larcker & Rusticus (2010), who state that the use of lagged values of an endogenous variable 
controls for the endogeneity, given that the exogenous part of the variable persists over time 
and that the endogenous part does not. Due to the banks’ earlier performance highly probably 
affecting the banks’ performance at the time of observation, the Lagged Performance Effect 
Model is created to control for this potential problem arising from the timing of observations. 
 
The variables included in the Lagged Performance Effect Model are presented in more detail in 
chapter 4.3. The model’s formula for each bank-quarter’s performance indicators i = (1, 2, … , 
13) is as follows: 
 
 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑞4 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑟𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃𝑞0 + 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑞−1 +
𝛽2𝑖𝐵𝐻𝐶 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑞−1 + 𝜀𝑖, (4) 
where  
Performance = performance indicator variables 1–13 presented in Table 2 
β0      = intercept 
rTARP   = ratio of received TARP funds to total assets at receipt of TARP funds 
BHC    = dummy variable indicating whether the bank is part of a multi-bank structure 
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Size     = total assets as last reported before receipt of TARP funds in $ billion 
ε      = error term 
 
4.4.3. TARP Receipt Probability Model 
The TARP Receipt Probability Model assesses the relationship between the receipt of TARP 
funds and the performance of the banks before the receipt of TARP funds. The model is used 
as a support model in this thesis to provide further insight into the conclusions drawn from the 
Performance Effect Model. The TARP Receipt Probability Model is a binary logistic regression 
model. The dummy variable TARP defined in section 4.3.2 is used as the independent variable 
in this model. The performance indicators values are observed on the quarter before the receipt 
of TARP funds (q-1). The performance indicators’ values are multiplied by 100 in order to 
observe the effects of 1 pp changes in the indicators instead of 100 pp changes. For the non-
TARP banks, the q0 (TARP receipt quarter) is defined as the average TARP receipt quarter, 
which is the first quarter of 2009. The model’s formula is as follows: 
 
 𝑝 = 𝐸(𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑃 = 1|𝛽′𝑋)  
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑝) = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑝
1 − 𝑝
) = 𝛽′𝑋 
𝛽′𝑋 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑞−1 × 100
13
𝑖=1 + 𝛽14𝐵𝐻𝐶 +
𝛽15𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑞−1 + 𝜀, (5) 
where 
Performance = performance indicator variables 1–13 presented in Table 2 
β0      = intercept 
TARP    = dummy variable indicating whether the bank received TARP funds 
BHC    = dummy variable indicating whether the bank is part of a multi-bank structure 
Size     = total assets as last reported before receipt of TARP funds in $ billion 
ε      = error term 
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5. RESULTS 
This section presents the results of the empirical study. First, summaries of the statistics of the 
base data and the samples used in the empirical study are presented. Secondly, the correlations 
between the variables used in the models are presented and interpreted. The last chapter of this 
section presents the results and interpretation of the Performance Effect Model, the Lagged 
Performance Effect Model, and the TARP Receipt Probability Model.  
 
5.1. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
The summary statistics for the base data and for the Performance Effect Model’s sample are 
presented in this chapter. The summary statistics for the base data described in chapter 4.2.2 is 
presented in Table 3 below. Noninterest expenses to total assets and noninterest income to total 
assets have high standard deviations of over 300 % due to the different operating models of the 
sample’s banks. Deposit growth rate and unused loan commitments to total loan commitments 
plus total assets have very high standard deviations due to a small amount of extreme values in 
both of the variables’ data. This can be observed from the percentile statistics presented in Table 
3, as in e.g. the Deposit growth rate variable, the mean is notably higher than the lowest value 
included in the 99th percentile. The other variables’ standard deviations are ca. 20 % or less. 
The base data’s high-variance variables’ samples are shown in Figure 2 on page 34. The total 
amount of bank-quarters in the dataset is 211 270, and the variable with least observations is 
loan loss provision to loans with 169 030 observations.  
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TABLE 3. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE BASE DATA 
The table presents the variables’ (set out in chapter 4.3) minimum values (Min.), maximum values (Max.), 
arithmetic means (Mean), medians (Median), standard deviations (Std. Dev.), highest values of first percentile (1st 
pctl.), lowest values of 99th percentile (99th pctl.), and number of bank-quarter observations (N) in the base data 
for the period Q1/2006–Q4/2013 described in chapter 4.2.2. 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 1st pctl. 99th pctl. N 
Dependent variables       
(1) Return on assets 1.64 % 1.62 % 5.19 % -14.98 % 10.98 % 174 326 
(2) Tier I common equity 
ratio 
11.16 % 9.62 % 7.44 % 4.12 % 45.10 % 203 757 
(3) Loan loss provision to 
loans 
1.91 % 0.77 % 4.44 % -1.02 % 19.21 % 169 030 
(4) Nonperforming loans to 
total loans 
3.02 % 1.54 % 4.59 % 0.02 % 22.09 % 182 367 
(5) Noninterest expenses to 
total assets 
16.61 % 7.40 % 365.08 % 1.55 % 38.05 % 203 729 
(6) Noninterest income to 
total assets 
10.77 % 1.26 % 328.80 % -0.51 % 26.94 % 203 011 
(7) Return on loans 17.81 % 16.79 % 10.07 % 4.72 % 40.43 % 201 780 
(8) Real estate loans to total 
loans 
69.68 % 73.65 % 20.02 % 5.57 % 99.62 % 204 915 
(9) Liquidity ratio 28.87 % 26.09 % 16.48 % 1.89 % 78.86 % 208 584 
(10) Illiquid assets to total 
assets 
69.96 % 73.37 % 16.45 % 12.59 % 94.68 % 209 189 
(11) Core deposits to total 
assets 
42.49 % 44.51 % 14.02 % 9.01 % 70.05 % 202 203 
(12) Deposit growth rate 4.65e15 1.62 % 2.05e18 -87.73 % 1894.29 % 193 987 
(13) Unused loan 
commitments to total loan 
commitments plus total 
assets 
26.28 % 3.23 % 1287.61 % 0.03 % 17.59 % 179 203 
Independent variables       
rTARP 0.10 % 0.00 % 0.72 % 0.00 % 2.61 % 211 270 
Control variables       
BHC 0.720 1 0.451 0 1 211 270 
Size (Total assets $ billion) 2.394 0.159 44.573 0.01 26.27 211 270 
 
The high-variance variables (noninterest expenses to total assets, noninterest income to total 
assets, deposit growth rate, and unused loan commitments to total loan commitments plus total 
assets) in the base data are presented plotted on a logarithmic scale (base 1 000) in the figure 
below. The extremely high values in the first two variables are most likely the result of 
intragroup allocations and extreme situations where the bank in question is near bankruptcy 
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hence having a very low amount of total assets. The extremely high values in the last two 
variables are likely due to intragroup allocations. 
 
FIGURE 2. BASE DATA'S HIGH-VARIANCE VARIABLES 
The figure below presents the base data’s four highest-variance variables’ observations plotted on a logarithmic 
(base 1 000) scale. The variables presented are noninterest expenses to total assets (Variable 5), noninterest income 
to total assets (Variable 6), deposit growth rate (Variable 12), and unused loan commitments to total loan 
commitments plus total assets (Variable 13). Negative and zero values are not plotted on the figure. 
 
 
Summary statistics for the Performance Effect Model’s sample are presented in Table 4 below. 
Additionally, selected summary statistics for the sample’s non-TARP and TARP banks 
separately is presented in Table 5 below. The sample includes 3 896 observations for all 
variables as the bank-quarters with incomplete data have been excluded from the sample. 436 
of the sample’s observations are TARP banks and 3 460 are non-TARP banks. The relative 
standard deviations of the variables are similar as in the base data. Noninterest expenses to total 
assets, noninterest income to total assets, deposit growth rate and unused loan commitments to 
total loan commitments plus total assets all have high standard deviations in the Performance 
Effect Model’s sample. The last mentioned two variables’ means are higher than their 
respective lowest values included in the 99th percentile. 
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TABLE 4. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE PERFORMANCE EFFECT MODEL'S 
SAMPLE  
The table presents the variables’ (set out in chapter 4.3) minimum values (Min.), maximum values (Max.), 
arithmetic means (Mean), medians (Median), standard deviations (Std. Dev.), highest values of first percentile (1st 
pctl.), lowest values of 99th percentile (99th pctl.), and number of bank-quarter observations (N) in the Performance 
Effect Model’s sample described in chapter 4.2.3. 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 1st pctl. 99th pctl. N 
Dependent variables       
(1) Return on assets 0.20 % 0.61 % 2.54 % -10.50 % 3.26 % 3 896 
(2) Tier I common equity 
ratio 9.64 % 9.14 % 3.08 % 2.55 % 20.06 % 
3 896 
(3) Loan loss provision to 
loans 1.47 % 0.55 % 4.52 % -0.01 % 14.88 % 
3 896 
(4) Nonperforming loans to 
total loans 4.45 % 2.75 % 5.40 % 0.05 % 27.34 % 
3 896 
(5) Noninterest expenses to 
total assets 3.57 % 3.03 % 2.50 % 1.39 % 14.83 % 
3 896 
(6) Noninterest income to 
total assets 0.81 % 0.57 % 1.49 % -0.45 % 6.27 % 
3 896 
(7) Return on loans 7.15 % 6.30 % 3.72 % 4.67 % 26.84 % 3 896 
(8) Real estate loans to total 
loans 73.80 % 76.64 % 16.24 % 25.83 % 99.18 % 
3 896 
(9) Liquidity ratio 26.47 % 24.40 % 13.10 % 4.23 % 63.90 % 3 896 
(10) Illiquid assets to total 
assets 73.29 % 75.04 % 11.54 % 38.36 % 92.98 % 
3 896 
(11) Core deposits to total 
assets 41.63 % 42.75 % 12.76 % 12.87 % 68.49 % 
3 896 
(12) Deposit growth rate 3.198e2 -4.68 % 1.607e4 -78.45 % 969 % 3 896 
(13) Unused loan 
commitments to total loan 
commitments plus total 
assets 
5.24 % 4.55 % 7.69 % 0.30 % 15.63 % 3 896 
Independent variables       
rTARP 0.28 % 0.00 % 1.11 % 0.00 % 3.69 % 3 896 
Control variables       
BHC 0.764 1 0.425 0 1 3 896 
Size (Total assets $ billion) 1.718 0.177 41.219 0.02 7.76 3 896 
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TABLE 5. SELECTED SUMMARY STATISTICS BY TARP STATUS 
The table presents the variables’ (set out in chapter 3.3) arithmetic means (Mean), medians (Median), and standard 
deviations (Std. Dev.) separately for TARP banks and non-TARP banks in the Performance Effect Model’s sample 
described in chapter 3.2.3. The TARP banks column includes observations for the 436 banks in the sample that 
received TARP funds. The non-Tarp banks column includes observations for the 3 460 banks in the sample that 
did not receive TARP funds. The TARP and non-TARP banks’ means with differences statistically significant at 
the 1 % level according to Welch’s t-test have been bolded in the TARP Banks column. The TARP and non-TARP 
banks’ medians with differences statistically significant at the 1 % level according to Mann-Whitney U test have 
been bolded in the TARP Banks column. 
 TARP Banks 
 
Non-TARP Banks 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Dependent variables        
(1) Return on assets -0.62 % 0.39 % 4.75 %  0.31 % 2.09 % 0.62 % 
(2) Tier I common equity 
ratio 
9.07 % 8.87 % 2.0 %  9.71 % 3.18 % 9.2 % 
(3) Loan loss provision to 
loans 
4.39 % 1.77 % 6.7 %  1.10 % 4.02 % 0.5 % 
(4) Nonperforming loans to 
total loans 
5.04 % 4.02 % 4.21 %  4.38 % 5.52 % 2.59 % 
(5) Noninterest expenses to 
total assets 
7.00 % 4.78 % 5.59 %  3.14 % 1.20 % 2.97 % 
(6) Noninterest income to 
total assets 
1.90 % 0.88 % 3.29 %  0.67 % 0.99 % 0.55 % 
(7) Return on loans 13.37 % 10.78 % 8.44 %  6.37 % 1.07 % 6.26 % 
(8) Real estate loans to total 
loans 
77.15 % 79.02 % 13.50 %  73.38 % 16.50 % 76.02 % 
(9) Liquidity ratio 21.78 % 20.59 % 10.16 %  27.06 % 13.31 % 25.14 % 
(10) Illiquid assets to total 
assets 
78.61 % 80.17 % 9.62 %  72.62 % 11.59 % 74.34 % 
(11) Core deposits to total 
assets 
34.35 % 33.43 % 12.29 %  42.54 % 12.52 % 44.13 % 
(12) Deposit growth rate 139.29 % -4.66 % 1501.95 %  3.599e2 1.706e4 -4.68 % 
(13) Unused loan 
commitments to total loan 
commitments plus total 
assets 
5.30 % 4.70 % 3.45 %  5.23 % 8.07 % 4.52 % 
Independent variables        
rTARP 2.53 % 2.33 % 2.30 %  0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 
Control variables        
BHC 0.846 1 0.361  0.753 0 1.000 
Size (Total assets $ billion) 11.995 0.456 122.669  0.424 1.391 0.163 
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5.2. STUDY OF CORRELATIONS 
5.2.1. Correlations in the Base Data 
Correlations between the base data’s variables are presented in Table 6 below. The vast majority 
of the correlations are statistically significant at the 1 % level. A clear exception is the 12th 
variable, deposit growth rate, which correlates only with return on assets and tier I common 
equity ratio at a 5 % level of significance. The reason for the low significances for the variable’s 
correlations is the high variance, which is described and discussed in more detail in the previous 
section. Only 11 of the 120 calculated Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables 
are over 0.2 or under -0.2.  
 
The highest correlation (Pearson coefficient 0.853) exists between noninterest expenses to total 
assets and noninterest income to total assets. The correlation between these was expected due 
to it being likely that a bank with a high or low amount of non-lending activity is expected to 
have high or low amounts of noninterest expenses and noninterest income, respectively. The 
second most evident correlation (Pearson coefficient -0.600) exists between illiquid assets to 
total assets and liquidity ratio. The negative correlation was expected due to the numerators of 
the two variables are mutually exclusive, i.e. if a bank has more ABS and MBS securities in its 
balance sheet, it decreases the percentage of its investment securities’ share of its total assets. 
Loan loss provision to loans and nonperforming loans to total loans are moderately highly 
negatively correlated with return on assets (Pearson coefficients -0.493 and -0.445, 
respectively). This is an expected correlation due to the variables numerators’ increase having 
a negative effect on a bank’s earnings. Loan loss provision to loans and nonperforming loans 
to total loans are also moderately highly correlated with each other (Pearson coefficient 0.396). 
All other correlation coefficients within the dataset are under 0.3, but no less than -0.3 in value.  
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TABLE 6. CORRELATIONS IN THE BASE DATA 
The table presents the base data’s variables’ Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients. The numbered variables’ explanations are presented in Table 2. The correlations 
are conducted pairwise, i.e. the number of observations varies between the correlation coefficients. The maximum amount of observations for a correlation between two variables 
in the sample is 211 270 and the respective minimum amount is 144 151. Statistical significance is indicated by * and ** at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) rTARP BHC Size 
 
(1) 
P
ea
rs
o
n
 C
o
rr
el
at
io
n
 C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 
 .100** -.493** -.445** .091** .181** .265** -.167** .105** -.021** .069** .005* .055** -.049** .053** .005* 
S
p
earm
an
 C
o
rrelatio
n
 C
o
efficien
ts 
(2) .100**  -.014** -.141** .119 .149** -.033** -.067** .190** -.293** -.145** .005 .136** -.035** -.267** -.023** 
(3) -.493** -.014**  .396** .069** .038** .191** .027** -.066** .036** -.020** -.001** .049* .071** -.018** .021** 
(4) -.445** -.141** .396**  .025** -.007** -.047** .218** -.049** -.012** -.026** -.002** -.022** .076** -.024** -.009** 
(5) .091** .119** .069** .025**  .853** .087** -.002** .002** -.045** -.027** .000** .139** -.003** -.038** -.001** 
(6) .181** .149** .038** -.007** .853**  .051** -.034** .005** -.044** -.035** .002** .137** -.004* -.045** -.001** 
(7) .265** -.033** .191** -.047** .087** .051**  -.091** -.006** -.026** .113** -.002** .050** -.037** .015** -.014** 
(8) -.167** -.067** .027** .218** -.002 -.034** -.091**  -.186** .287** -.241** .000** -.117** .047** -.044** -.057** 
(9) .105** .190** -.066** -.049** .002 .005* -.006** -.186**  -.600** .099** -.003** .043** -.046** -.044 -.020** 
(10) -.021** -.293** .036** -.012** -.045** -.044** -.026** .287** -.600**  -.179** .004** -.070** .062** .130** -.041** 
(11) .069** -.145** -.020** -.026** -.027** -.035** .113** -.241** .099** -.179**  -.003** -.033** -.102** .059** -.094** 
(12) .005* .005* -.001 -.002 .000 .002 -.002 .000 -.003 .004 -.003  .000* .000** -.004** .000** 
(13) .055** .136** .049** -.022** .139** .137** .050** -.117** .043** -.070** -.033** .000  -.002** -.031** -.001** 
rTARP -.049** -.035** .071** .076** -.003 -.004 -.037** .047** -.046** .062** -.102** .000 -.002  .025** .025** 
BHC .053** -.267** -.018** -.024** -.038** -.045** .015** -.044** -.044** .130** .059** -.004 -.031** .025**  .014** 
Size .005* -.023** .021** -.009** -.001 -.001 -.014** -.057** -.020** -.041** -.094** .000 -.001 .025** .014**  
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5.2.2. Correlations in the Performance Effect Model’s Sample 
Correlations between the Performance Effect Model’s sample’s variables are presented in Table 
7 below. The vast majority of the correlations are statistically significant at the 1 % level. As in 
the base data, the 12th variable, deposit growth rate, is the only one without significant 
correlations at the 1 % level with the other variables. The reason for the low significances for 
the variable’s correlations is the high variance, which is described and discussed in more detail 
in section 5.1. In the sample, 19 of the 120 calculated Pearson correlation coefficients between 
the variables are over 0.2 or under -0.2. Respectively, 11 of 120 are over 0.3 or under -0.3, and 
4 of 120 are over 0.5 or under -0.5. The independent variable rTARP is not highly correlated 
with any of the dependent or control variables. Moderate correlation is observed with return on 
loans (Pearson coefficient 0.392) and noninterest expenses to total assets (Pearson coefficient 
0.325), both significant at the 1 % level.  
  
The highest correlation (Pearson coefficient 0.771) exists between noninterest expenses to total 
assets and return on loans. The second highest correlation (Pearson coefficient -0.766) exists 
between loan loss provision to loans and return on assets. This is an expected correlation due 
to loan loss provisions’ increase having a negative effect on a bank’s earnings and thus on the 
return on assets. The third most evident correlation (Pearson coefficient -0.677) exists between 
illiquid assets to total assets and liquidity ratio. The reasons for the correlation are discussed in 
the previous section. The fourth highest correlation (Pearson coefficient 0.563) exists between 
noninterest expenses to total assets and noninterest income to total assets. The reasons for the 
correlation are discussed in the previous section. 
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TABLE 7. CORRELATIONS IN THE PERFORMANCE EFFECT MODEL’S SAMPLE 
The table presents the Performance Effect Model’s Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients. The numbered variables’ explanations are presented in Table 2. The number 
of observations for all correlations is 3 896. Statistical significance is indicated by * and ** at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) rTARP BHC Size 
S
p
earm
an
 C
o
rrelatio
n
 C
o
efficien
ts
 
(1) 
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  .241** -.427** -.499** -.275** .222** .269** -.287** .156** -.109** .054** .021 .056** -.081** .150** -.012 
(2) .282**   -.181** -.187** -.090** -.066** .135** -.092** .151** -.161** .021 .016 -.012 -.052** -.203** -.229** 
(3) -.767** -.195**   .467** .174** .065** .050** .070** -.162** .182** -.142** -.024 -.016 .291** .061** .239** 
(4) -.439** -.273** .281**   .209** -.029 -.117** .285** -.177** .108** -.046** -.115** -.143** .131** .024 .190** 
(5) -.366** -.081** .331** .111**   .468** .314** .010 -.163** .065** .014 -.056** -.026 .273** .013 -.092** 
(6) .079** -.020 .107** -.016 .563**   .214** -.113** .044** -.083** -.024 -.042** .076** .173** .251** .225** 
(7) -.140** -.009 .352** -.006 .771** .394**   -.258** .065** -.149** .216** .028 -.286** .219** .066** -.269** 
(8) -.107** -.098** -.014 .258** .024 -.032* -.033*   -.191** .210** -.216** .038* -.174** .073** -.177** .268** 
(9) .123** .188** -.082** -.150** -.111** .001 -.045** -.191**   -.664** .093** .049** -.079** -.131** .008 -.078** 
(10) -.087** -.189** .072** .050** .095** -.028 .055** .223** -.677**   -.228** -.048** .132** .193** -.026 .222** 
(11) -.006 -.015 -.036* .019 -.081** -.078** -.081** -.208** .087** -.211**   .105** -.242** -.198** .060** -.474** 
(12) .006 .003 -.005 -.011 -.006 -.003 -.005 .021 -.010 .010 .002   -.057** .001 -.102** -.063** 
(13) .059** .041* -.048** -.087** .075** .092** .049** -.163** -.003 .033* -.077** .004   .024 .106** .250** 
rTARP -.099** -.025 .161** .031 .325** .144** .392** .067** -.100** .137** -.161** -.005 .003   .060** .242** 
BHC .060** -.224** .026 .006 .034* .101** .067** -.144** -.012 -.008 .047** -.036* .008 .015   .204** 
Size -.018 -.022 .122** .000 .121** .167** .121** -.049** -.002 -.033* -.081** -.001 .029 .062** .019   
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5.3. RESULTS OF THE PERFORMANCE EFFECT MODEL 
The results including coefficients with statistical significance indicators, standard errors, and 
adjusted R2 statistics of the Performance Effect Model are presented in Table 8 below. The 
variables and details of the model itself are presented in chapter 4.  
  
TABLE 8. RESULTS OF THE PERFORMANCE EFFECT MODEL 
The table presents the regression parameter estimates for the Performance Effect Model. The independent variable, 
rTARP, is the received TARP funds’ size divided by total assets. Dependent variables are measured at fourth 
quarter after receipt of TARP funds and annualized. The control variable “Size” is measured in $ billions. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses and the adjusted R2 statistic on the right hand side. The model includes 3 896 
observations for each variable. Statistical significance is indicated by * and ** at the 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Independent 
variable 
 
Control variables 
  
Dependent variables 
 
rTARP 
 
BHC Size 
 
Adj. R2 
Return on assets  -.227**  .004** -8.019e
-06  .013 
  (.037)  (.001) (9.844e
-06)   
Tier I common equity ratio  -.057  -.016** -1.250e-05  .050 
  (.043)  (.001) (1.169e
-05)   
Loan loss provision to loans  .627**  .002 .000**  .038 
  (.064)  (.002) (1.726e
-05)   
Nonperforming loans to total loans  .152  .001 -2.358e-06  .000 
  (.078)  (.002) (2.102e
-05)   
Noninterest expenses to total assets  .719**  .002 6.133e
-05**  .116 
  (.034)  (.001) (9.157e
-06)   
Noninterest income to total assets  .179**  .003** 5.701e-05**  .054 
  (.021)  (.001) (5.662e
-06)   
Return on loans  1.293**  .005** 8.672e
-05**  .166 
  (.049)  (.001) (1.324e
-05)   
Real estate loans to total loans  1.054**  -.055** .000**  .027 
  (.232)  (.006) (6.240e
-05)   
Liquidity ratio  -1.185**  -.003 1.539e
-05  .009 
  (.189)  (.005) (5.079e
-05)   
Illiquid assets to total assets  1.455**  -.003 .000**  .020 
  (.165)  (.004) (4.452e
-05)   
Core deposits to total assets  -1.814**  .015** .000**  .033 
  (.182)  (.005) (4.889e
-05)   
Deposit growth rate  -6539.079  -1351.925* .111  .001 
  (23257.408)  (606.419) (6.260)   
Unused loan commitments to total loan 
commitments plus total assets 
 .007  .001 5.323e-05  .000 
 (.111)  (.003) (2.996e-05)   
 
The model’s adjusted R2 statistics are relatively low in the majority of dependent variables’ 
cases. Only noninterest expenses to total assets and return on loans have an adjusted R2 value 
of over 0.1.  Return on loans has the highest adjusted R2 value of 0.166. The results of the model 
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are mostly statistically significant at the 1 % level. Out of 13 coefficients between the 
independent and dependent variables, nine are significant at the 1 % level and one at the 5 % 
level, while three are not statistically significant. The control variable “Size” (total assets in $ 
billion) is the only variable with less significant results. The relative size of received TARP 
funds has had a mixed effect on the performance of the recipient banks compared to each other 
and to banks not receiving TARP funds: four of the ten statistically significant indicators seem 
to have been negatively affected. The effects on the indicators and their underlying factors are, 
however, not completely straightforward, as discussed in the next section. The implications of 
the model’s findings on the hypotheses of this thesis are discussed in section 5.4 in connection 
with interpretation of the Lagged Performance Model’s results. 
 
5.3.1. Profitability Effect Results 
The dependent variables 1, 3, 5, 6, and 7 or return on assets, loan loss provision to loans, 
noninterest expenses to total assets, noninterest income to total assets, and return on loans, 
respectively, are profitability measures. The most fundamental overall profitability measure 
observed in this thesis is variable 1, return on assets, as it includes all items of the profit and 
loss statement and the total amount of assets in the balance sheet. All of the profitability 
measures have statistically significant results in the model at the 1 % level for the independent 
variable rTARP. 
 
The relative size of received TARP funds has had a negative effect on return on assets, loan 
loss provision to loans, and noninterest expenses to total assets (regression parameters -0.227, 
0.627, and 0.719, respectively). All of these indicators’ results are to some extent at the 
discretion of the banks’ managers, meaning that the seemingly negative immediate effects can 
ultimately be neutral or positive. Loan loss provisions are deemed to be the most important 
accrual item in the banking industry and of material importance from the viewpoint of bank 
performance by Beatty & Liao (2014). 
 
The most evident effect has been on noninterest expenses to total assets (coefficient 0.719), 
which is, for a significant part, at the discretion of the banks’ managers. This a significant 
impact as the standard deviation of the variable in the sample is only 2.50 %. Despite having a 
negative effect on the immediate profitability indicators of a bank, the increase in noninterest 
expenses is not necessarily a negative sign. The increase in noninterest expenses can be the 
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result of managers deciding to spend a normalized sustainable amount after having to spend an 
unsustainably small amount during the difficult quarters preceding the TARP injections, 
therefore indicating a positive change in the banks’ performance. The second highest coefficient 
(0.627) of the aforementioned negatively affected indicators is for loan loss provision to loans. 
E.g. Harris et al. (2013) report a similar effect on their study on listed banks only. Similarly to 
noninterest expenses, the rise in loan loss provision to total loans in the fourth quarter after 
receiving the TARP funds is not necessarily an overall negative effect on the banks in the mid 
to long term. This is an interesting finding providing motive for further research, as even though 
a consistent loan loss provision model has not arisen in the accounting literature (Beatty & Liao 
2014), the discovery of the effect of received TARP funds’ on the managerial discretion over 
loan loss provisions would be highly informative. Loan loss provisions is also an item that is 
often subjected to management’s discretion and even a predictor of positive future cash flows 
(Liu & Ryan 1995; Wahlen 1994).  
 
Of the profitability indicators, TARP funds have had the least significant negative effect on 
return on assets (coefficient -0.227). Firstly, the decrease in return on assets can be deemed 
anticipated as the receipt of TARP funds increases the denominator of the return on assets 
formula. Secondly, the negative effect on return on assets raises a similar question of TARP 
funds’ effect on banks’ performance as does the negative effect on the aforementioned 
indicators. If the banks’ managers have seen the TARP funds as an enabler for provisioning for 
loan losses and normalizing the noninterest expense levels, this would result in a reduction in 
return on assets without actually weakening the banks’ underlying performance. In addition to 
the mentioned effects on the numerator of the return on assets indicator, TARP funding has also 
had an effect on the indicator’s denominator, i.e. total assets. Receiving TARP funds increases 
the amount of total assets of a bank and therefore reduces the return on assets indicator, ceteris 
paribus. In addition, despite the overall credit supply was positively stimulated by TARP 
injections according to Li (2013), it might be that the banks have had a lag in their capability to 
utilize the received extra capital as efficiently as their pre-TARP capital, thus not being as 
profitable as prior to the capital injection. 
 
The relative size of received TARP funds has had a positive effect on variables 6 and 7, or 
noninterest income to total assets and return on loans, respectively. As opposed to the indicators 
discussed above, that were seemingly negatively affected by the relative size of the TARP 
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injections, the indicators showing positive reaction to TARP are mostly not under the discretion 
of the banks’ managers. 
 
Relative TARP injection size has had the most evident positive effect on return on loans 
(coefficient 1.293). This is a very significant effect as the coefficient is high and as TARP 
injections were not, in general, provided for banks with a high proportion of distressed loans in 
their portfolios (Bayazitova & Shivdasani 2012). In addition, the standard deviation of return 
on loans in the sample is only 3.72 %. This effect on return on loans suggests that the relative 
size of received TARP funds has indeed enhanced the receiving banks’ performance. The 
increase in return on loans while simultaneously experiencing a decrease in return on assets can 
indicate that the banks receiving the largest proportional amounts of TARP funds have had 
problems deploying the full amount of received TARP funds to profitable uses, but the amount 
that has been deployed has performed exceptionally well for the banks receiving the largest 
proportional amounts of TARP funds. In addition to return on loans, the relative size of TARP 
funds received has had a positive impact on noninterest income to total assets (coefficient 
0.179). The increase is, however, modest and considerably smaller than the increase in 
noninterest expenses to total assets (coefficient 0.719), and is not therefore highly significant. 
The implications of the model’s findings on the hypotheses of this thesis are discussed in section 
5.4 in connection with interpretation of the Lagged Performance Model’s results. 
 
5.3.2. Balance Sheet Effect Results 
The dependent variables 2, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 or tier I common equity ratio, 
nonperforming loans to total loans, real estate loans to total loans, liquidity ratio, illiquid assets 
to total assets, core deposits to total assets, deposit growth rate, and unused loan commitments 
to total loan commitments plus total assets, respectively, are balance sheet based indicators 
measuring the solvency and/or other financial health of the banks. Four of the eight indicators 
have statistically significant results in the model at the 1 % level for the independent variable. 
Tier I common equity ratio, deposit growth rate, and unused loan commitments to total loan 
commitments plus total assets do not show statistically significant results for the independent 
variable rTARP.  
 
Real estate loans to total loans, liquidity ratio, illiquid assets to total assets, and core deposits 
to total assets all show statistically significant results for the independent variable rTARP. The 
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three last mentioned variables’ effects are all negative, or more precisely, have contributed to 
making the banks’ capital structures riskier (coefficients -1.185, 1.455, and  
-1.814, respectively). Core assets to total assets declining implies that the TARP funds have not 
been invested into core (i.e. the least risky) assets at as high ratio as before the TARP injections. 
The decline in liquidity ratio implies that the amount of cash to total assets has been decreased, 
making the balance sheets of the banks riskier. This might also be resultant of the proportion of 
investment securities increasing, which cannot be categorized as more or less risky without 
further information, as the investment securities with increased allocations might be less or 
more risky than the banks’ average assets. The increase in illiquid assets to total assets is mostly 
analogous in nature with the decrease in liquidity ratio. The risk-increasing effect of TARP 
injections found in the model’s results is in line with e.g. Duchin & Sosyura (2014) and Black 
& Hazelwood (2013) who report findings implicating that the TARP funds contribute to riskier 
investments made by the recipients. The coefficient of nonperforming loans to total loans 
(0.152) is not significant at the 5 % level, but at the 5.3 % level, i.e. the result can be deemed 
significant. This value also indicates a negative effect on the TARP recipients’ balance sheets. 
Real estate loans to total loans (coefficient 1.054) has increased with the amount of TARP funds 
to total assets. Despite Cornett et al. (2013) finding that banks with more real estate loans in 
their balance sheets were more likely to repay TARP fund earlier, this effect cannot be simply 
categorized as a negative or positive, but more a descriptive indicator. The implications of the 
model’s findings on the hypotheses of this thesis are discussed in the next section in connection 
with interpretation of the Lagged Performance Model’s results. 
 
5.4. RESULTS OF THE LAGGED PERFORMANCE EFFECT MODEL 
The Lagged Performance Effect Model’s sample differs from the Performance Effect Model’s 
sample due to the addition of one variable and missing data points within it. The sample size is 
2 986 compared to Performance Effect Model’s 3 896. The results for the independent q-1 
performance variable are statistically significant at the 1 % level for all variables except for 
deposit growth rate. The addition of the independent q-1 performance variable into the model 
increases the adjusted R2 statistics dramatically. The adjusted R2 values range from 0.118 to 
0.794 compared to 0.009–0.166 in the Performance Effect Model for the variables that show a 
statistically significant result for the independent variable rTARP.  
 
 46 
 
The estimated effects of the independent variable rTARP on the dependent variables in the 
Lagged Performance Effect Model is, as expected due to high similarity of samples, highly 
similar to that estimated by the Performance Effect Model: all dependent variables for which 
the first model estimated significant positive or negative effects show positive or negative 
effects, respectively in the second model. The added independent q-1 performance variable has 
had a more significant effect on the balance sheet based indicators than rTARP. For most of the 
balance sheet based indicators, the q-1 performance variable’s regression coefficient is ca. 0.9. 
Unlike for the balance sheet based indicators, rTARP has had a clearly higher impact on the 
profitability indicators than the q-1 performance indicator. The  
q-1 profitability performance variables’ regression coefficients’ absolute values are less than 0.2 
for all of the indicators. This implies a more stable behavior in the balance sheet items’ 
development in comparison to the profit & loss statement items in reaction to received TARP 
funds.  
 
In the light of these results, the hypothesis H1 stating that the received TARP funds’ relative 
size has an effect on the banks’ performance can be accepted, but the effect is, at least 
seemingly, mixed. The effect could be deemed positive instead of mixed, if the TARP funds’ 
relative size’s negative effect on return on assets and loan loss provision to total loans were 
proven to be the result of managers’ discretion. For example Bushman (2014) notes that 
opportunistic accounting choices might play a role in a pattern of managers’ behavior, and that 
these choices may be made in response to increased pressure. This finding sets a basis for further 
research on the result planning of banks after receipt of TARP funds. 
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TABLE 9. RESULTS OF THE LAGGED PERFORMANCE EFFECT MODEL 
The table presents the regression parameter estimates for the Lagged Performance Effect Model. rTARP is the 
received TARP funds’ size divided by total assets. Corresponding performance indicators are the corresponding 
indicators at the end of the latest quarter before receiving TARP funds for the dependent variable in each 
regression. The control variable “Size” is measured in $ billions.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses and 
the adjusted R2 statistic on the right hand side. The model includes 2 986 observations for each variable. Statistical 
significance is indicated by * and ** at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Independent variables 
  
Control variables  
Dependent variables (q4)  rTARP 
Corresponding 
performance 
indicator (q-1) 
 
 BHC Size  
Adj. 
R2 
(1) Return on assets  -.205** 
(.036) 
.180**   .000 -5.851e-6  .139 
  (.009)   (.001) (.000)   
(2) Tier I common equity 
ratio 
 .091** 
(.029) 
.684** 
(.011) 
  .003** 
(0.001) 
4.537×10-6 
(.000) 
 .576 
      
(3) Loan loss provision to 
loans 
 .718** 
(.050) 
.110** 
(.012) 
  .002 
(.001) 
.000** 
(.000) 
 .118 
         
(4) Nonperforming loans to 
total loans 
 .143* 
(.062) 
1.364** 
(.023) 
  -.003 
(.002) 
3.893e-6 
(.000) 
 .535 
         
(5) Noninterest expenses to 
total assets 
 .841** 
(.039) 
.101** 
(.009) 
  .003* 
(.001) 
5.656e-5** 
(.000) 
 .162 
         
(6) Noninterest income to 
total assets 
 .221** 
(.019) 
.161** 
(.007) 
  .002** 
(.001) 
4.583e-5** 
(.000) 
 .226 
         
(7) Return on loans  1.148** 
(.060) 
-.121** 
(.011) 
  .006** 
(.002) 
7.873e-5** 
(.000) 
 .201 
      
(8) Real estate loans to 
total loans 
 .091 
(.065) 
.936** 
(.005) 
  .000 
(.002) 
1.067e-5 
(.000) 
 .922 
         
(9) Liquidity ratio  .184 
(.097) 
.875** 
(.009) 
  -.003 
(.003) 
2.048e-5 
(.000) 
 .761 
      
(10) Illiquid assets to total 
assets 
 .236* 
(.097) 
.846** 
(.011) 
  .002 
(.003) 
1.013e-5 
(.000) 
 .684 
         
(11) Core deposits to total 
assets 
 -.396** 
(.097) 
.893** 
(.009) 
  .004 
(.003) 
5.335e-7 
(.000) 
 .772 
         
(12) Deposit growth rate  -7.973e3 
(2.934e4) 
.000 
(.000) 
  -1.731e3** 
(.796e3) 
.120 
(7.185) 
 .000 
      
(13) Unused loan 
commitments to total loan 
commitments plus total 
assets 
 -.259** 
(.061) 
1.143** 
(.011) 
  .011** 
(.002) 
-5.122e-5** 
(.000) 
 .794 
 
5.4.1. Profitability Effect Results 
All profitability indicators – return on assets, loan loss provision to loans, noninterest expenses 
to total assets, noninterest income to total assets, and return on loans – show results very close 
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to those of the Performance Effect Model’s for the independent variable rTARP, as expected 
due to similar samples. The independent variable rTARP has had a more significant effect on 
each of the profitability indicators than their respective q-1 performances. The significant and 
high positive effect of received TARP funds’ relative size on return on loans supports accepting 
the hypothesis H2d stating that the received TARP funds’ relative size has had an effect on the 
banks’ lending activities’ profitability. Meanwhile, the mixed effect of received TARP 
contributions’ relative size on the profitability of the banks supports rejecting the hypothesis 
H2c stating that the received TARP funds’ relative size has an effect on the banks’ overall 
profitability. However, due to the possible managerial discretion over the discussed parts of the 
banks’ profitability, rejecting or accepting this hypothesis requires further research on the 
subject. 
 
5.4.2. Balance Sheet Effect Results 
The q-1 performance has had a clear and significant effect on the q4 balance sheet based 
performance of the banks in the sample. On the contrary to the profitability indicators, the q-1 
performance has a significantly more evident effect on the independent variables than the 
independent variable rTARP. All of the statistically significant estimates of the balance sheet 
based independent performance q-1 variable’s regression coefficients are very high, ranging 
from 0.684 to 1.364 (including the coefficient for liquidity ratio, which is not significant at the 
5 % level, but at the 5.8 % level), whereas the respective rTARP coefficients’ absolute values 
range from 0.091 to 0.396. These findings support accepting the main hypothesis H1 stating 
that the relative size of received TARP funds has had an effect on the banks’ performance. 
However, the effect has been mixed depending on which performance indicator is studied, and 
the overall performance effect is left unclear as the discretionary items’ usage is not revealed 
by this study. The findings do not support accepting hypothesis H2a nor H2b stating that the 
relative size of received TARP funds would have an effect on the banks’ solvency or risk taking, 
as the results show relatively small effects on the indicators and the effects are mixed in effect. 
 
5.5. RESULTS OF THE TARP RECEIPT PROBABILITY MODEL 
The TARP Receipt Probability Model’s results are presented in Table 10 below. Of the 3 932 
banks in the sample, 430 received TARP funds and 3 502 did not. The Cox & Snell pseudo R2 
of the model is 0.219. Five of the thirteen independent performance indicator variables show 
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statistically significant results at the 1 % level. The indicators with statistically significant 
results are tier I common equity ratio, return on loans, liquidity ratio, illiquid assets to total 
assets, and core deposits to total assets. Of the control variables, BHC shows a statistically 
significant result at the 1 % level and Size shows significant results at the 8.8 % level.  
 
The abovementioned independent variables’ statistically significant results all suggest that 
TARP funds were allocated for banks with weaker performance in the quarter preceding the 
TARP injections. The most evident effect on the likelihood of receiving TARP funds has been 
implied by return on loans and tier I common equity ratio. Return on loans has had the most 
significant effect: the likelihood of receiving TARP funds has decreased by a factor of 0.779 
for a one percentage point increase in the return on loans indicator at q-1. One percentage point 
increase in tier I common equity ratio decreased a bank’s likelihood of receiving TARP funds 
significantly, by a factor of 0.829, which is in line with the findings of Cornett et al. (2013) 
using the same variables. 
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TABLE 10. RESULTS OF THE TARP RECEIPT PROBABILITY MODEL 
The table presents the regression parameters (β) and the odds ratios (exponentiations of the regression parameters, 
eβ) for the TARP Recipient Probability Model. The dependent variable TARP is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 for the 430 banks in the sample that received TARP funds and the value of 0 for the 3 502 banks that 
did not. The independent performance indicator variables are measured at the end of the latest reported quarter 
before receipt of TARP funds and multiplied by 100 in order to observe 1 pp changes’ effect on likelihood. The 
model includes 3 932 observations for each variable. Statistical significance is reported in parentheses. Statistical 
significance is indicated by * and ** at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  TARP (dependent variable) 
Independent variables (× 100, q-1)  
 
β  eβ 
(1) Return on assets  .012 
(.638) 
   1.012 
(.638)    
(2) Tier I common equity ratio  -.188** 
(.000) 
 0.829** 
 (.000)    
(3) Loan loss provision to loans  -.001 
(.948) 
 .999 
(.948)    
(4) Nonperforming loans to total loans  -.022 
(.390) 
 .978 
(.390)    
(5) Noninterest expenses to total assets  -.012 
(.600) 
 .988 
(.600)    
(6) Noninterest income to total assets  .033 
(.251) 
 1.034 
(.251)    
(7) Return on loans  -.249** 
(.000) 
 0.779** 
(.000)    
(8) Real estate loans to total loans  -.003 
(.591) 
 .997 
(.591)    
(9) Liquidity ratio  -.033** 
(.000) 
 .968** 
(.000)    
(10) Illiquid assets to total assets  .028** 
(.006) 
 1.029** 
(.006)    
(11) Core deposits to total assets  -.031** 
(.000) 
 .969** 
(.000)    
(12) Deposit growth rate  .000 
(.727) 
 1.000 
(.727)    
(13) Unused loan commitments to total loan commitments 
plus total assets 
 -.012 
(.583) 
 .988 
(.583) 
   
Control variables 
    
     
BHC  .647** 
(.001) 
 1.910** 
(.001)    
Size (Total assets $ billion)  .048 
(.088) 
 1.050 
(.088)    
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The independent variables liquidity ratio, illiquid assets to total assets, and core deposits to total 
assets all show a smaller effect on the likelihood of receiving TARP capital. The odds ratios for 
these independent variables are 0.968, 1.029, and 0.969, respectively. The finding regarding 
core deposits to total assets supports Cornett et al. (2013), who also find a higher core deposits 
to total assets value having a statistically significant negative effect on probabilities of receiving 
TARP funds.  
 
Even though the effects of the aforementioned variables’ values on the likelihood of receiving 
TARP capital are significantly smaller than those of tier I common equity ratio’s and return on 
loans’, they are still significant as the standard deviations of these variables are between 14 % 
and 17 % in the base data. These findings would support answering the main research question 
with an affirmative, i.e. stating that a fair and optimal distribution of the TARP capital has been 
conducted.  
 
In addition to the independent variables’ effects, the control variables have had a statistically 
significant effect on the likelihood of receiving TARP funds. If a bank is part of a BHC 
structure, it has been 1.910 times more likely to receive TARP funding. This is a highly 
significant result in the statistical sense, being significant at less than the 1 % level. However, 
the relevance of the finding is miniscule, as under 30 % of the banks in the samples are not part 
of a BHC structure and the non-BHC banks are on average very small compared to BHC banks. 
Furthermore, regarding the bank size’s effect on the receipt probability, a $1 billion increase in 
bank’s total assets has increased the likelihood of receiving TARP capital by a factor of 1.050, 
i.e. the larger the bank, the higher its probability for receiving a TARP injection. This is in line 
with an earlier study by Cornett et al. (2013), who find that banks with $500 million or more in 
total assets were more likely to receive TARP funds than banks with less than $500 million in 
total assets.  
 
Even though the TARP Receipt Probability Model presented above does not yield statistically 
significant results for eight out of the thirteen dependent variables, the findings of the TARP 
Receipt Probability Model are interpreted to support acceptance of hypothesis H3 through the 
most relevant findings of the results. This is due to finding that the banks with a lower tier I 
common equity ratio and/or lower return on loans have clearly been more likely to receive 
TARP funds.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
This section concludes the literature review and empirical study conducted in this thesis. The 
conclusions are presented from the viewpoint of the research question and hypotheses. In 
addition to conclusions, the observed limitations of this thesis are also briefly discussed. Lastly, 
this section presents suggestions for further research. 
 
6.1. CONCLUSIONS ON TARP’S OPTIMAL AND FAIR ALLOCATION 
In this thesis, TARP funds’ effect on banks’ performance is studied by reviewing prior literature 
and by conducting an empirical study utilizing the regression models presented earlier. The 
main research question of this thesis is “Were the TARP funds allocated optimally and fairly 
among the U.S. banking industry’s entities?”. The main research question cannot be 
unequivocally answered through the study conducted as the results of the empirical study yield 
contradictory results.  
 
However, some of the performance indicators are seemingly negatively affected by the size of 
received TARP funds, relative to the recipient’s size, and some are seemingly positively 
affected. This mixed effect of TARP on the whole bank sample would suggest that the funds 
were not allocated unfairly, as no direct causality between TARP and higher or lower 
performance is detected. As depicted in the next section, the results of this study still leave open 
the possibility that the relative size of received TARP funds did, in fact, provide its recipient 
with an unfair advantage, if the seemingly negative effects are accountable for discretionary 
items. 
 
6.2. CONCLUSIONS ON TARP’S EFFECT ON PERFORMANCE 
Earlier literature has found that receiving TARP funds has had a negative effect on a banks 
efficiency while not increasing the amount of lending, TARP has induced moral hazard, and 
that TARP funds were high-cost capital for the receiving banks. On the contrary, earlier studies 
also state that TARP recipients received competitive advantage, increased their market share, 
and increased their market power. The findings of earlier literature are, hence, mixed on the 
subject of TARP’s effect on banks’ overall performance. 
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This study’s findings support accepting the main hypothesis H1 stating that the relative size of 
received TARP funds has had an effect on the banks’ performance. However, the models 
estimated in this thesis provide results with mixed effects on the performance indicators, 
depending on which performance indicator is studied. The overall performance effect is left 
unclear as the discretionary items’ usage is not revealed by this study. For example, the relative 
size of received TARP funds has had a negative effect on return on assets, loan loss provision 
to loans, and noninterest expenses to total assets, but the relative size of received TARP funds 
has had a positive effect on noninterest income to total assets and return on loans. Furthermore, 
the effect of managers’ discretion over these indicators is not known. 
 
The findings of this study do not unanimously support accepting or rejecting hypothesis H2a nor 
H2b stating that the relative size of received TARP funds would have an effect on the banks’ 
solvency or risk taking, as the results show relatively small effects on the indicators and the 
effects are mixed in effect. Liquidity ratio, illiquid assets to total assets, nonperforming loans 
to total loans, and core deposits to total assets are all showing negative results, or more 
precisely, have contributed to making the banks’ capital structures riskier. On the other hand, 
in the Lagged Performance Effect Model, the tier I common equity ratio shows a statistically 
significant positive reaction for received TARP funds. The acceptance of H2a or H2b based on 
these results alone would be precipitate, as many of the indicators are, for a large part, subject 
to managers’ discretion.  
 
Meanwhile, the mixed effect of received TARP contributions’ relative size on the profitability 
of the banks supports rejecting the hypothesis H2c stating that the received TARP funds’ relative 
size has an effect on the banks’ overall profitability. However, due to the possible managerial 
discretion over the discussed parts of the banks’ profitability, rejecting or accepting this 
hypothesis requires further research on the subject. The significant and high positive effect of 
received TARP funds’ relative size on return on loans supports accepting the hypothesis H2d 
stating that the received TARP funds’ relative size has had an effect on the banks’ lending 
activities’ profitability.  
 
The results of the TARP Receipt Probability Model implicate that banks with weaker balance 
sheets and poorer profitability have been more likely to receive TARP capital injections, which 
in its part suggests that the TARP injections have been invested fairly among the potential 
recipients. This is also supported by earlier studies finding that healthier banks were more likely 
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to reject TARP funding. This result allows the acceptance of H3, which states that “The banks’ 
prior performance has an effect on the banks’ probability to receive TARP funds”. 
 
Despite the hypothesis H1 being concluded with mixed effects, and hypotheses H2a, H2b, and 
H2c being left without an undisputed conclusion, this study does find that banks receiving TARP 
funds have, before TARP, had smaller returns on loans and less tier I common equity compared 
to their total assets. It is interesting to note that the rise in relative amount of TARP funds 
received has not increased the banks’ tier I common equity ratios very notably (though they 
have increased), but the return on loans has experienced a significant surge. This is, even though 
the clearest measured factor affecting the probability to receive TARP funds has been precisely 
return on loans. If the negative effects of TARP receipt found in this study are indeed the result 
of managements’ discretion over certain items, it would suggest a significant positive overall 
reaction for receipt of TARP funds as the positively reacted return on loans is one of the least 
discretionary indicators analyzed in this study. 
 
6.3. TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Despite the main research question left being only partly answered, this thesis provides 
information complementing the earlier literature and a basis for further research on various 
topics. For example, as this thesis assumes that the “TARP trigger” for non-TARP banks is the 
average date of TARP receipts, the results may suffer from the effect of selection bias. One way 
to further research the topic would be to select more randomly timed samples of non-TARP 
banks corresponding each TARP bank in the sample. Another topic for further research is the 
extreme variance of some of the performance indicators studied in this thesis.  
 
As this thesis studies only the effect of relative size of received TARP funds after one year after 
receipt, another interesting research topic is the longer-term effect. The effect of relative size 
of received TARP funds could be visible more clearly after e.g. two or three years after the 
TARP injections and/or with cumulated performance indicators. A study concentrating on 
performance indicators two or three years from the TARP injection could also shed light on the 
matter of discretionary items as the “true” effects of the TARP injections could then possibly 
be better visible if the effect of the potential managers’ result manipulation would already have 
faded. However, when studying the longer-term effects, the utilization of profits generated by 
the TARP injections’ capital would have to be taken into consideration. 
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The most pressing topic for further research stemming from this thesis is, however, the usage 
of discretionary items by the banks’ managers around the receipt of TARP funds. The evident 
contradiction in the effect of relative size of received TARP funds on return on assets and on 
return on loans is an interesting finding. Return on assets’ is calculated using net profit after 
taxes, which includes all profit & loss statements items, and therefore is potentially highly 
dependent on the items that are under bank managers’ discretion. One interesting topic for 
further research is that is there evidence of unusual usage of discretionary items in U.S. banks 
around the TARP program and which discretionary items have been most used to steer the 
results. The finding that return on loans has been positively affected also leaves open the 
question whether the relative size of received TARP funds has indeed had a positive effect on 
the recipients’ performance, as would be expectable referring to the earlier studies finding that 
TARP recipients gained market power, market size and competitive advantage. An interesting 
question arises from these findings: Did U.S. banks accumulate writedown backlogs before the 
initiation of TARP, and did these banks use the TARP proceeds to unravel this backlog? 
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APPENDIX 1: DESCRIPTIONS OF CALL REPORT CODES USED 
 
Call Report Code Description 
RSSD ID RSSD ID of Reporting Entity 
NM_SHORT Name Short 
RCON9999 Date of Report 
REG_HH_1_ID Regulatory High Holder 
RIAD4107 Total Interest Income 
RCFD2170 Total Assets 
RIAD4010 Interest and Fee Income on Loans, Total 
RIAD4079 Total Noninterest Income 
RIAD4093 Total Noninterest Expense 
RIAD4230 Provision for Loan and Lease Losses 
RIAD4340 Net Income (Loss) 
RCFD8274 Tier 1 Capital Allowable Under the Risk-Based Capital Guidelines 
RCFD1410 Loans Secured by Real Estate 
RCFD2122 Total Loans and Leases, Net of Unearned Income 
RCFD2123 Unearned Income on Loans 
RCON2215 Total Transaction Accounts 
RCFD1403 Total Loans and Lease Finance Receivables: Nonaccrual 
RCFDG301 Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS): Residential Pass-Through Securities: 
Guaranteed by GNMA: Held-to-Maturity Fair Value 
RCFDG303 Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS): Residential Pass-Through Securities: 
Guaranteed by GNMA: Available-for-Sale Fair Value 
RCFDG305 Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS): Residential Pass-Through Securities: Issued by 
FNMA and FHLMC: Held-to-Maturity Fair Value 
RCFDG307 Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS): Residential Pass-Through Securities: Issued by 
FNMA and FHLMC: Available-for-Sale Fair Value 
RCFDG309 Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS): Residential Pass-Through Securities: Other 
Pass-Through Securities: Held-to-Maturity Fair Value 
RCFDG311 Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS): Residential Pass-Through Securities: Other 
Pass-Through Securities: Available-for-Sale Fair Value 
RCFDG313 Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS): Other Residential MBS (Include CMOS, 
REMICS, and Stripped MBS): Issued or Guaranteed by FNMA, FHLMC, or GNMA 
- Held-to-Maturity Fair Value 
RCFDG315 Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS): Other Residential MBS (Include CMOS, 
REMICS, and Stripped MBS): Issued or Guaranteed by FNMA, FHLMC, or GNMA 
- Available-for-Sale Fair Value 
RCFDG317 Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS): Other Residential MBS (Include CMOS, 
REMICS, and Stripped MBS): Collateralized by MBS Issued or Guaranteed by 
FNMA, FHLMC, or GNMA - Held-to-Maturity Fair Value 
RCFDG319 Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS): Other Residential MBS (Include CMOS, 
REMICS, and Stripped MBS): Collateralized by MBS Issued or Guaranteed by 
FNMA, FHLMC, or GNMA - Available-for-Sale Fair Value 
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Call Report Code Description 
RCFDG321 Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS): Other Residential MBS (Include CMOS, 
REMICS, and Stripped MBS): All Other Residential MBS - Held-to-Maturity Fair 
Value 
RCFDG323 Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS): Other Residential MBS (Include CMOS, 
REMICS, and Stripped MBS): All Other Residential MBS - Available-for-Sale Fair 
Value 
RCFD2150 Other Real Estate Owned 
RCFD8509 Fair Value of Held-to-Maturity Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS), Total 
RCFD8511 Fair Value of Available-for-Sale Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS), Total 
RCFDC027 Total (Asset-Backed Securities) Fair Value - Available-for-Sale 
RCFDC988 Asset-Backed Securities: Held-to-Maturity-Fair Value 
RCFDF639 Loans Measured at Fair Value That Are Past Due by 90 Days or More: Fair Value 
RCON3814 Unused Commitments - Revolving, Open-End Lines Secured by 1-4 Family 
Residential Properties 
RCON3815 Unused Commitments - Credit Card Lines 
RCON3817 Unused Commitments - Securities Underwriting 
RCON6550 Commercial Real Estate, Construction, and Land Development: Commitments to 
Fund Loans Not Secured by Real Estate 
RCON6648 Total Time Deposits of Less Than $100,000 
RCONF164 1-4 Family Residential Construction Loan Commitments 
RCONF165 Commercial Real Estate, Other Construction Loan and Land Development Loan 
Commitments 
RCONJ457 Other Unused Commitments: Commercial and Industrial Loans 
RCONJ458 Other Unused Commitments: Loans to Financial Institutions 
RCONJ459 Other Unused Commitments: All Other Unused Commitments 
RCFD0071 Interest-Bearing Balances 
RCFD0081 Noninterest-Bearing Balances and Currency and Coin 
RCFD1754 Held-to-Maturity Securities, Total 
RCFD1773 Available-for-Sale Securities, Total 
 
